TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can start the claim functionality only once.
- The owner can initialize the stages.
- The owner can update the stage parameters.
- The owner can emergency stop the stage.
- The owner can end the current stage.
- The owner can finalise the presale only once.
- The owner can update the token address before the claim starts.
- The owner can update the treasury address.
- The owner can update the feed address.
- The owner can update the referral BPS.
- The owner can update the vesting parameters.
- The owner can update the purchase limit.
- The owner can whitelist the payment tokens.
- The owner can delist the payment tokens.
- The owner can enable or disable whitelisting.
- The owner can whitelist the buyers.
- The owner can remove buyers from the whitelist.
- The owner can enable/disable the EOA-only mode.
- The owner can set the minimum block gap.
- The owner can pause the presale.
- The owner can withdraw the accidental funds from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the ZNS-Connect smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the ZNS-Connect team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Unbounded minBlockGap Parameter Allows for Denial of Service
The setMinBlockGap() function permits the contract owner to set the required number of blocks that must elapse between an address's subsequent purchases. Critically, this function lacks any validation to enforce an upper limit on the gap parameter. This oversight allows a malicious or careless owner to set the minBlockGap to an arbitrarily large value. Doing so would cause the purchase condition block.number >= lastPurchaseBlock[msg.sender] + minBlockGap to become perpetually false for any user who has already made one purchase, effectively disabling them from participating further in the presale and creating a denial-of-service condition.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Insufficient Validation of Parameters in initialize Function
The initialization function lacks essential validation for several parameters that are configured at the time of deployment. Specifically, it fails to verify that the minimum purchase amount is not greater than the maximum, that the vesting cliff is not longer than the total vesting duration, and that the vesting duration is non-zero when vesting is active. This oversight could lead to the contract being deployed in a logically flawed or non-functional state, potentially blocking all purchases or causing all token claims to fail permanently due to a division-by-zero error.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Missing Proper Validation for Parameters in updateVestingParams
The updateVestingParams function allows the contract owner to modify the core vesting parameters (vestingPercentage, cliffDuration, and vestingDuration) at any time before the presale has ended. This function lacks two critical validation checks. First, it fails to ensure that if vestingPct is greater than zero, the duration must also be greater than zero. This allows the owner to set a vesting schedule with a zero-length duration, which directly leads to a division-by-zero error in the claimable function, permanently blocking all users from claiming their vested tokens. Second, it does not validate that the cliff duration is less than or equal to the total vesting duration, allowing for the creation of a logically inconsistent vesting schedule.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 optimization Issue
Redundant Storage Reads Increase Gas Costs in claimable Function
The claimable function, which calculates a user's claimable token amount, reads the same state variables from storage multiple times within a single execution. Specifically, the cliffDuration and vestingDuration variables are each subject to multiple SLOAD operations. While view functions are free for users to call off-chain, each SLOAD is a computationally expensive opcode that consumes node resources. For any potential on-chain contract interactions that might call this public function, these redundant reads lead to higher, unnecessary gas consumption, making the function less efficient than it could be.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
Inflexible Referrer Assignment Logic Permanently Locks Referrer
The _processPurchase function contains logic to assign a referrer to a user. This assignment is strictly a one-time event; it only occurs if the user does not already have a referrer recorded in their User struct. Consequently, the first address to ever refer a user is permanently credited for that user's entire lifetime of purchases within the contract. This inflexible "first-touch" attribution model could be misaligned with the intended business logic if the goal is to reward the referrer responsible for each individual transaction. It may lead to user disputes or situations where ongoing marketing efforts are not properly incentivized, as new referrers cannot get credit for driving subsequent purchases from an existing user.