TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

66.76
Poor Excellent

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Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0x64BE...86a5
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/11/03
Revision date 2025/11/03

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can enable trading only once.
  • The owner can set the buy and sell tax to not more than 25%.
  • The owner can set the tax reduction parameters.
  • The owner can add/remove an address from the whitelist.
  • The owner can add addresses to the whitelist in batches.
  • The owner can set the treasury address.
  • The owner can toggle the auto liquidity settings.
  • The owner can set the max threshold value to not more than 1% of the total supply.
  • The owner can set the max slippage value to not more than 10%.
  • The owner can create a pair manually only once.
  • The owner can add liquidity manually.
  • The owner can mint unlimited tokens.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the ZNS-Connect smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the ZNS-Connect team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 2 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Uncapped Minting Function Grants Owner Unlimited Control Over Token Supply
ZNS.sol
L442-444
Description

The contract contains a public mint function that is restricted to the owner. This function allows the owner to create an arbitrary number of new tokens and send them to any address, at any time, with no restrictions. There is no hard cap defined for the total supply within the contract, nor is there any on-chain mechanism to limit the rate or total amount of minting. This grants the owner unilateral and infinite power to inflate the token supply. This capability can severely dilute the value for all other token holders, undermine any claim of scarcity in the token's economic model, and pose a significant trust issue for investors and participants in the ecosystem. An attacker who compromises the owner's keys could mint an infinite number of tokens for themselves, drain the liquidity pool, and destroy the token's value.

Pending

#2 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
ZNS.sol
L329-351
Description

The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.

low Issues | 2 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Liquidity Portion of Tax is Held in Contract Indefinitely, Requiring Centralized Manual Intervention
ZNS.sol
L297-319
Description

The contract's tax mechanism is designed to split tax revenue into a portion for the treasury and a portion for building liquidity. However, the implementation only transfers the treasury's portion immediately, while the liquidity portion is left stranded in the contract's own address. There is no automated function to pair these accumulated tokens with ETH and add them to the Uniswap liquidity pool. This functionality is entirely dependent on a future, manual intervention from the owner calling the addLiquidity function. This breaks the promise of an "auto-liquidity" feature, introduces a significant centralization risk, and prevents the collected funds from contributing to the token's market depth in a timely and trustless manner as users would expect.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
Improper Validation in setTaxReductionParams Creates Denial of Service
ZNS.sol
L215-233
Description

The setTaxReductionParams function, which allows the owner to configure the progressive tax reduction schedule, suffers from improper validation of its input parameters. Specifically, it fails to ensure that the stepTx parameter—representing the number of transactions per reduction step—is a non-zero value. This oversight allows the owner to set stepTx to 0, which creates a latent division-by-zero error in the _getEffectiveTaxRate function. The moment the tax reduction is scheduled to begin, this error will be triggered on every buy and sell, causing all taxable transactions to revert and permanently halting all trading on the Uniswap pair.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
ZNS.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.