Yieldz Info
yields.cc is a customized user interface that interacts with open-source smart contracts on several blockchains (e.g., Sonic, Ethereum, and others). The underlying open source smart contracts enable projects with tokens based on the ERC20 token standard, to create a single sided staking solution. With this staking solution, the project can reward uncertain incentives for the project's token holders.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
StakingOverTimeReward.sol
- The owner can update the config in the contract.
- The owner can declare the staking reward pool.
- The owner can reset the staking mechanism.
- The owner can open the staking.
- The owner can start the staking period.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Yieldz smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Yieldz team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Improper resetting of timeAnnounced.
Resetting timeAnnounced and timeOpened in _updateConfig can lead to inconsistencies if rewards have already been announced. If the contract owner calls updateConfig after announcing rewards, resetting timeAnnounced to 0 removes the record of the announcement, potentially invalidating pending rewards. Similarly, resetting timeOpened could disrupt staking progress if users were expecting to stake based on an already-opened period. To mitigate this, the function should prevent updates if timeAnnounced > 0, ensuring that configuration changes do not erase previously announced rewards. Adding a condition like if (timeAnnounced > 0) revert StakingOverTimeReward__AnnouncedAlready(); prevents unintended resets.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
purge Can Be Called Immediately After announce.
The purge function allows the owner to withdraw all reward tokens if no users have staked. However, since there is no time restriction, the owner can call announce() to deposit rewards and immediately call purge() to withdraw them, creating a false impression of an active staking pool while retaining full control over the funds. This could mislead users into believing that staking is open when, in reality, the rewards were withdrawn instantly. To mitigate this, a time lock should be added, ensuring purge() cannot be executed immediately after announcement.
low Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
TotalRewards mismanagement
The updateConfig function allows the contract owner to update totalRewards at any time before staking starts. However, there is no check to ensure that the new totalRewards is not lower than what was already announced or expected by stakers. If rewards have already been announced via announce() and users have started staking based on the initially promised totalRewards, reducing this value later would create a discrepancy between expected and actual rewards. if announce() was called with 1000 tokens but updateConfig() later reduces totalRewards to 500, stakers may have already calculated their expected rewards based on the initial 1000 tokens pool. This could lead to disputes, unfair distribution, or even users receiving fewer rewards than anticipated. To ensure fairness and prevent reward mismanagement, the contract should include a check to prevent totalRewards from being reduced after announcement.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
No Check to Prevent Multiple Announcements
The function does not check whether timeAnnounced has already been set. This means the owner can call announce multiple times, potentially overriding a previous reward declaration. This could lead to double deposits or unexpected reward modifications. To mitigate this, Add a check to prevent multiple announcements.
Resolved
#4 low Issue
Missing check for totalRewards.
Check that the total reward value is greater than zero.