Yieldz Info
yields.cc is a customized user interface that interacts with open-source smart contracts on several blockchains (e.g., Sonic, Ethereum, and others). The underlying open source smart contracts enable projects with tokens based on the ERC20 token standard, to create a single sided staking solution. With this staking solution, the project can reward uncertain incentives for the project's token holders.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
StakingBase.sol
- The owner can enable or disable the staking functionality in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Yieldz smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Yieldz team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Incorrect Handling of _shareRest (ETH Remainder)
The issue with _shareRest = _value % _recipients; arises when the total ETH (msg.value) is not perfectly divisible by the number of recipients. The modulo operation (%) calculates the remainder, but in the current implementation, this remainder is not explicitly distributed, leading to potential ETH loss or misallocation. For example, if msg.value = 10 wei and there are 3 recipients, each would receive 3 wei, but 1 wei would be left unaccounted for. This results in an incomplete distribution of ETH, which can accumulate over multiple transactions and cause inaccuracies in payouts. To mitigate this issue, the remainder _shareRest should be added to the first recipient’s share to ensure no ETH is lost. By adjusting the logic so that (i == 0) receives _share + _shareRest, all ETH is correctly allocated. Additionally, ensuring that _sendValue > 0 before transferring ETH prevents cases where extremely small amounts cause unintended failures.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Unchecked ETH Transfers in _processValue
The _processValue function does not check whether ETH transfers succeed, using Address.sendValue without handling failures. If a recipient is a contract with a failing fallback function or runs out of gas, the entire transaction reverts, preventing ETH distribution and causing gas wastage. This is problematic as one failing transfer blocks payments to all recipients. To mitigate this, replace sendValue with .call{value: _sendValue}(""), which allows failure handling. If a transfer fails, log it using emit ServiceFeeFailed(_receivers[i], _sendValue);, ensuring other recipients still receive their ETH.
low Issues | 5 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Missing events.
It is recommended that all the critical parameter changes be emitted.
Acknowledged
#3 low Issue
Missing zero check for _amount.
It is recommended to check that the value should not be zero.
Resolved
#4 low Issue
Missing checks for zero ETH per recipient
The issue in _processValue arises when msg.value is smaller than the number of recipients, leading to an integer division where _share = _value / _recipients results in zero ETH per recipient. Since Solidity does not handle decimal values, this can cause transactions to fail when attempting to transfer 0 wei, leading to gas wastage and unexpected failures. Additionally, if ETH is too small to distribute evenly, the function becomes redundant, executing unnecessary computations before ultimately failing. To mitigate this issue, a check should be added to ensure that the total ETH sent is at least equal to the number of recipients using require(_value >= _recipients, "Staking: Insufficient ETH to distribute");. This guarantees that each recipient gets at least 1 wei, preventing reverts and optimizing gas usage.
Resolved
#5 low Issue
_amount is Cast to uint256 Without Validation
_amount is declared as int256, but it’s cast to uint256 without ensuring it’s positive. If _amount is negative (indicating withdrawal), it may lead to unintended staking logic errors. If _amount is -10, the cast will wrap the negative number to an extremely large uint256 value, leading to catastrophic errors. _amount = -10 is cast to uint256(-10), which becomes 2^256 - 10 (a huge value). Instead of reducing the stake, it adds an enormous amount, corrupting the contract. So, explicitly validate _amount before casting require(_amount >= 0, "Staking: Amount cannot be negative for deposits"); So that the value cannot be negative.