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XDoor Info

xdoor.vercel.app

The blockchain world is a vast universe of infinite possibilities — behind every door lies an unknown realm of opportunity and risk. You never know what awaits when you open the next door — it could be fortune and growth, or it could be danger and loss. Every door is a choice, and every push forward marks a turning point. XDOOR stands as the gateway to the unknown, a mysterious entrance at the edge of the X-Layer world. Each XDOOR represents a new beginning. Some hesitate before it. Others push forward with courage. Every brave decision can change your destiny. A choice is not merely an action — it is the key to meeting your fate.

XDoor Logo
Onboarded date 04/12/2025

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

15.98
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/12/05
Revision date 2025/12/05

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can call the joinGame function to register a new player who has made a qualifying token purchase.
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can end round.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can set the buy threshold value to any arbitrary value.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can set the extended time to any arbitrary value.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can set the countdown duration value to any arbitrary value.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can update the prize ratio.
  • The ADMIN_ROLE can set the round end time and max countdown to any arbitrary value.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Fomo3d smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the XDoor team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
3
Medium
1
Low
Optimization
Informational
medium Issues | 3 findings

Acknowledged

#1 medium Issue
Prize Pool Inflation Due to Misaligned Claim Window
Fomo3d.sol
L100-131
Description

The contract's prize pool accounting contains a critical calculation flaw stemming from a mismatch between the prize claim window and the historical data used for pool calculation. The claim function allows users to claim prizes for up to two previous rounds (e.g., from Round 1 during Round 3), but the _updatePrizePool function only accounts for the locked prizes of the immediate two preceding rounds when calculating the current totalPool. This desynchronization means that starting from Round 4, the calculation for the available prize pool will fail to subtract the still-payable debts from three rounds prior. This inflates the totalPool with funds that are already owed to past winners, causing the contract to over-promise rewards for the current round. This will inevitably lead to a state where the contract's total ETH balance is less than the sum of all promised rewards, causing legitimate claim transactions from winners to fail due to insufficient funds.

Comments

The prize pool accounting logic must be corrected to account for all outstanding debts. The getPreviousTwoLockedPrizePool function should be renamed and modified to getOutstandingPrizeDebts and should iterate back through all rounds that are still within the valid claim window (i.e., currentRound - round < 3), summing up their lockedPrizePools values. This will ensure that the totalPool is always calculated based on the true amount of unencumbered ETH in the contract, preventing the prize fund from becoming insolvent and ensuring all winners can be paid.

Acknowledged

#2 medium Issue
Unchecked Administrative Inputs Allow Game Manipulation and Bricking
Fomo3d.sol
L100-131
Description

The administrative functions accessible via the ADMIN_ROLE lack any input validation on their parameters. This creates a severe centralization risk, as a compromised or malicious admin can permanently break the game. Specifically, functions like setCountdownDuration and setRoundEndTime do not enforce any sanitary checks on their time-based inputs. An admin could call setCountdownDuration with an extremely large value, which would cause the endRound function to set the next round's end time to a date thousands of years in the future. This would permanently trap the game in an unwinnable round, as the onlyGameEnded modifier would never pass again. As a result, no new winners could be declared, and all future funds sent to the contract would be irrevocably locked.

Comments

Implement strict require statements at the beginning of all administrative functions to validate their inputs and enforce sensible operational bounds. For all time-related parameters (extendTime, duration, newExtendTime, time), the contract must check that the input is within a reasonable, hardcoded range (e.g., greater than a few seconds and less than a few months). This will prevent an admin from either accidentally or maliciously setting a parameter that could lead to a permanent denial of service for the game.

Acknowledged

#3 medium Issue
Unchecked Administrative Privileges Allow for Game Manipulation and Permanent Locking of Funds
Fomo3d.sol
L289-291
L292-294
L295-297
L304-306
L307-309
Description

The set of administrative functions available to the ADMIN_ROLE possess a critical lack of input validation, creating severe centralization risks. These functions allow an admin to change core game parameters such as buyThreshold, countdownDuration, and roundEndTime without any sanity checks on the incoming values. A malicious or compromised admin can exploit this by setting these parameters to extreme or illogical values. For instance, setting countdownDuration to a near-infinite number would permanently lock the game in an unwinnable state, trapping all future prize funds in the contract forever. Similarly, the setRoundEndTime function can be abused as a "win button" to end the round prematurely and guarantee a victory for the admin. This complete absence of validation grants the admin unchecked power to manipulate, break, or corrupt the game's logic and fairness at will, undermining the trust and security of the entire Fomo3d system.

Comments

To secure the contract, it is essential to implement strict require statements at the beginning of every administrative function. These statements must enforce sensible, hardcoded operational bounds on all inputs to constrain the admin's power. For all time-related parameters (extendTime, duration, newExtendTime, time), the contract must check that the input is within a reasonable range (e.g., greater than a few seconds and less than a few months). Financial thresholds like buyThreshold should have a plausible maximum value to prevent the game from becoming unplayable. These validation checks are crucial to protect the game's integrity from both accidental operator errors and deliberate malicious attacks.

low Issues | 2 findings

Acknowledged

#1 low Issue
Silent Failures in joinGame Logic Prevent Player Entry
Fomo3d.sol
L74-98
Description

There is a logic mismatch between how the Fomo3d contract reports a failure and how the XDoorBaseToken contract handles it. When a player's purchase amount is below the required buyThreshold, the joinGame function is designed to return false instead of reverting the transaction. However, the XDoorBaseToken contract calls joinGame within a try/catch block that is only capable of catching transaction reverts, not boolean return values. As a result, when joinGame returns false, the try block is incorrectly treated as a success, and the catch block—which is supposed to emit a Fomo3dJoinGameFailed event—is never executed. This creates a silent failure condition where a player is not entered into the game, but no on-chain error is registered, making the failure invisible and preventing any monitoring or remediation.

Comments

The communication between the two contracts must be made explicit and robust. The try block in the XDoorBaseToken contract should be modified to handle the boolean return value. It should be structured as try fomo3d.joinGame(...) returns (bool success) followed by an if (!success) check inside the try block. If the call returns false, the contract should explicitly revert with a descriptive error message. This will ensure that any failure to join the game is properly caught by the catch block, the appropriate failure event is emitted, and the failure condition is made visible and auditable on-chain.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
Fomo3d.sol
L289-291
L292-294
L295-297
L304-306
L307-309
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.