WRBIG Info

BiG Agency (BiG) introduces the Bigganos Token (BIG), a revolutionary utility token designed to create a transparent, efficient, and incentivised ecosystem for insurance contractors.

WRBIG Logo

Team and KYC Verification

The KYC verification for this project is currently in progress.

The team has submitted their information and verification is pending.

KYC Badge

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

80.00
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/04/08
Revision date 2025/04/08

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can pause/un-pause the exchange functionality in the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the WRBIG smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the WRBIG team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

/

Functions
public

/

State variables
public

/

Total lines
of code

/

Capabilities
Hover on items

/

Findings and Audit result

medium Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
BiGExchange.sol
L40-44
L75-77
Description

The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.

Resolved

#2 medium Issue
Inconsistent ETH Handling Between receive() and fallback()
BiGExchange.sol
L51
Description

The BiGExchange contract contains a critical inconsistency in its ETH handling: while the receive() function properly reverts direct ETH transfers, the empty fallback() function silently accepts calls with non-empty calldata and attached ETH. This inconsistency creates a vulnerability where users can bypass the intended ETH rejection by simply including arbitrary calldata with their transaction, potentially resulting in ETH being permanently locked in the contract since no withdrawal mechanism exists. To mitigate this issue, the fallback() function should be modified to explicitly revert with the same error as the receive() function: revert BigExchange__DirectTransferNotAllowed();. This ensures consistent rejection of all ETH transfers regardless of the presence of calldata, protecting the contract from unintended ETH accumulation.

Resolved

#3 medium Issue
Precision Loss in Exchange Rate Calculation
BiGExchange.sol
L80-99
Description

The exchangeBiGForUsdc function suffers from potential precision loss due to Solidity's integer division truncation when calculating: (bigAmount * EXCHANGE_RATE_BIG_TO_USDC) / EXCHANGE_RATE_DENOMINATOR / (10 ** DECIMALS_DIFFERENCE). Each division operation independently truncates results, compounding rounding errors and causing users to receive slightly less USDC than theoretically expected. This effect becomes more noticeable with non-round token amounts and could lead to inconsistent effective exchange rates depending on transaction size. To mitigate this issue, the calculation should be restructured to minimize truncation points by combining divisions into a single operation: (bigAmount * EXCHANGE_RATE_BIG_TO_USDC) / (EXCHANGE_RATE_DENOMINATOR * (10 ** DECIMALS_DIFFERENCE)). This approach ensures only one truncation event occurs rather than multiple sequential ones, providing more consistent and mathematically accurate exchange results. For production financial contracts, implementing a dedicated fixed-point arithmetic library would offer the most precise solution.

low Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
BiGExchange.sol
L75-77
Description

Emit all the critical parameter changes.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
BiGExchange.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.