Wistaverse Info
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Overall Score
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not
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TrustNet DataPulse
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner can mint
It is possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token can be burned
There is a function to burn tokens in the contract.
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Scope of Work
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
This BSC contract is a bridged contract, the mint function is here to allow tokens to be transferred from polygon and the max overall supply will never exceed 42 000 000.
Minter privileges
- minter can mint new tokens when tokens are bridged from polygon
Burner privileges
- can burn tokens from an arbitrary address without allowance
FeeManager privileges
- fees cannot exceed 0.5%
WhitelisteManager privileges
- update an address as whitelisted
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Floating pragma
The contract is not using an explicit pragma version. The current version is ^0.8.0 in the contract, but it was deployed at the version "v0.8.4+commit.c7e474f2". A specific pragma version, like the latest one (0.8.20), is recommended.
optimization Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Public function that could be declared external (external-function)
Use the `external` attribute for functions never called from the contract.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Declare explicit types
Change all "uint" types to an explicit type of "uint256" that the contract uses the types consistently.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Functions that are not used (dead-code)
Remove unused functions.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Missing dead address check
The "FeeManager" can set the "feeCollector" address to the dead address. It is recommended to check for a dead address also. Otherwise, the fees will be sent to the dead address, and the fees will be lost.
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.