TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This security audit encompasses the evaluation of the backend codebase for the WinUp Lottery Platform, a Node.js/TypeScript application. The primary commit hash or version reviewed should be documented by the development team to ensure traceability of the findings to a specific code state. The necessary source code files and project structure were made available for this assessment.
The auditing process consisted of the following systematic steps:
- Project Understanding & Specification Review: Analyze the provided project description, source code structure, and inferred functionalities to understand the application's architecture, scope, and intended operations as a Web3 raffle platform.
- Systematic Code Examination: Conduct a thorough module-by-module review of the backend source code (including main application setup, environment configuration, routing, middleware, controllers, models, and scripts) to identify potential vulnerabilities, security weaknesses, and areas for improvement.
- Functionality & Logic Alignment: Verify that the code appears to implement the described functionalities (e.g., user login via Phantom wallet, draw creation, ticket purchasing, winner selection) and assess the logical correctness of these implementations from a security perspective.
- Security Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the codebase against established industry best practices for web application security, API security, data handling, and Node.js/TypeScript development to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and overall security posture. This includes checking against the pre-defined security concerns provided (Authentication, Authorization, Secure Data Storage, XSS/CSRF Protection, Rate Limiting, etc.).
- Vulnerability Analysis: Analyze how various components interact and how potential inputs (API requests, system events) affect execution paths to identify edge cases, race conditions, and specific vulnerabilities such as those related to data integrity, access control, and error handling.
- Configuration Review: Examine configuration files (e.g., `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `Dockerfile`) for potential misconfigurations, insecure defaults, or outdated dependencies that could impact security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to remediate identified vulnerabilities and to secure and optimize the application.
It is important to note that this review was based on a static analysis of the provided backend codebase at a specific point in time. Any modifications made to the codebase after this review may introduce new conditions or vulnerabilities not covered herein. No dynamic analysis, penetration testing, or frontend code review was performed as part of this specific engagement.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
This initial security audit of the WinUp Lottery Platform backend codebase identified several distinct issues primarily concentrated in areas of data integrity for critical operations (ticket purchasing and winner declaration), input validation, winner selection consistency, file upload security, and TypeScript environment setup. Our goal is to ensure that the technical team understands the scope of work required to achieve a production-ready and secure application.
The application demonstrates a generally good modular structure typical of Node.js/Express applications. However, without remediation, the identified vulnerabilities, particularly those rated critical and high, could expose the platform to inconsistent data states, potential manipulation, denial of service, and other security risks. A phased remediation plan, prioritizing the critical and high-severity findings, is strongly recommended.
Technical Summary
- Data Integrity & Transactions: Multiple critical database operations (e.g., ticket purchase affecting user and draw records; winner declaration affecting draw, user, and winner records) are performed without atomicity, risking data inconsistency on partial failure.
- Winner Selection: Winner selection logic is duplicated and inconsistently triggered, creating risks of race conditions and inconsistent states. This logic needs to be centralized and made robust.
- Input Validation: Comprehensive input validation (types, formats like ObjectIDs, enums, ranges) is largely missing across controllers, posing risks of errors and unexpected behavior.
- File Uploads: Lack of file type and size validation for image uploads (draws, banners, ticket levels) presents security risks (e.g., upload of malicious files, DoS).
- Authentication & Authorization: Core JWT authentication and role-based access control are in place. However, issues such as potential user identity manipulation in one function and redundant admin checks were noted. 'JWT_SECRET' handling needs a startup check.
- API Security: No rate limiting is implemented. Some CORS configurations are overly permissive.
- TypeScript Environment: Persistent TypeScript errors due to missing/incorrect type definitions (notably for Mongoose and Express) were observed, hindering static analysis and type safety.
- Error Handling: Error responses often leak detailed internal error information to the client. No global standardized error handler.
Audit Checklist & Key Remediation Areas
- Transactional Integrity: Ensure all multi-document database writes for critical operations (ticket purchase, winner declaration) are wrapped in MongoDB transactions.
- Centralized Winner Selection: Consolidate winner selection logic into the cron job ('script/drawResult.ts'), removing it from API controllers, and ensure it handles all draw completion conditions robustly.
- Input Validation: Implement comprehensive schema and value validation for all API request parameters (body, query, path) using a library like 'express-validator' or Joi.
- File Upload Security: Enforce strict file type (MIME type) and size limits for all uploads. Consider image sanitization.
- TypeScript Health: Ensure all necessary '@types' packages are correctly installed (user must run 'npm install'/'yarn install' after 'package.json' updates). Resolve all TypeScript errors and implicit 'any' types. Configure 'tsconfig.json' for production builds ('outDir', 'sourceMap').
- API Security Enhancements: Implement API rate limiting. Tighten CORS policies for Socket.IO and static file serving.
- Secure Configuration: Add application startup checks for essential environment variables (e.g., 'JWT_SECRET', 'MONGODB_URI').
- Error Handling Standardization: Implement a global error handler to provide generic error messages to clients in production while logging detailed errors server-side.
- Dependency Security: User must run 'npm audit' or 'yarn audit' to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in third-party packages.
- User Identity Protection: Ensure 'req.user' (from 'auth' middleware) is the sole source of truth for user identity in operations like ticket purchasing.
- Authorization Logic: Remove redundant admin authorization checks in controllers, relying on the 'adminAuth' middleware.
- Dockerfile for Production: Refactor Dockerfile to use multi-stage builds, remove dev tools, and run as a non-root user for production deployments.
Recommended Remediation Roadmap
- Core Integrity & TypeScript Stability:
- Fully implement and test MongoDB transactions for 'buyTicket' (user/draw participation updates) and the centralized winner declaration process in 'script/drawResult.ts'.
- Run 'npm install'/'yarn install' to fix 'package.json' type definitions. Resolve all TypeScript compiler errors and explicit 'any' types.
- Implement comprehensive input validation across all API endpoints.
- Ensure user identity for actions is derived from 'req.user', not request bodies.
- API & Upload Security:
- Implement API rate limiting globally or on sensitive endpoints.
- Strictly configure CORS for Socket.IO and static assets.
- Add file type and size validation to all 'multer' configurations.
- Configuration & Error Handling:
- Add startup checks for critical environment variables.
- Implement a global error handling middleware.
- Remove redundant admin authorization checks from controllers.
- Production Hardening:
- Refactor 'Dockerfile' for secure, lean production images.
- Add necessary 'build' and 'start:prod' scripts to 'package.json'.
- Conduct 'npm audit'/'yarn audit' and remediate vulnerable dependencies.
- Define and document a secure process for admin user creation.
- Further Enhancements (Medium/Optimization):
- Address gaps in the ticket reservation system (user-linking, timeouts) if the feature is retained.
- Refine logging practices to avoid leaking sensitive data.
- Apply 'tsconfig.json' optimizations and database schema enhancements (e.g., unique constraints).
Note: This report covers the backend Node.js/TypeScript codebase. No frontend code, smart contracts (beyond conceptual interactions implied by a Web3 platform), or live penetration testing was performed. It is crucial to integrate these findings into the development backlog and verify all remediations, especially for critical and high-severity issues, ideally with a follow-up targeted review before any production launch involving real assets or user data.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
critical Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 critical Issue
Lack of Atomicity in Critical Operations
Several critical operations, most notably ticket purchasing in 'controllers/ticketController.ts' (updating user and draw participation) and winner declaration in 'script/drawResult.ts' (updating 'Draw', 'User', and 'Winner' models), involve multiple database writes that are not performed atomically. If one write fails, the system's data becomes inconsistent, potentially leading to incorrect ticket counts, failed winner recordings, or users not seeing their wins/participations correctly.
Resolved
#2 critical Issue
Inconsistent Winner Selection Logic
Winner selection logic is duplicated and inconsistently triggered: once in 'controllers/ticketController.ts -> buyTicket' if a limited draw sold out, and also in the cron job ('script/drawResult.ts') for time-expired or sold-out draws. This creates risks of race conditions and inconsistent states. This logic needs to be centralized into 'script/drawResult.ts' with transactional integrity.
high Issues | 5 findings
Pending
#1 high Issue
Missing or Incomplete Input Validation
Many controllers ('drawController', 'ticketController', 'bannerController', 'winnerController') lack comprehensive validation for request parameters (body, query, path params). This includes: Missing validation for data types (strings, numbers, booleans). Missing format validation (MongoDB ObjectIDs for IDs like 'drawId', 'ticketPackageId', 'winnerId'; date strings; enum values for 'status', 'ticketType', 'paymentStatus'). Missing range checks (e.g., for 'limit' in pagination, numerical inputs). Lack of schema validation for JSON strings parsed from request body (e.g., 'levels' in 'ticketController.addTicket').
Resolved
#2 high Issue
User Identity Manipulation in buyTicket
The 'buyTicket' function in 'controllers/ticketController.ts' accepts 'userId' and 'walletAddress' from 'req.body' instead of solely relying on 'req.user' populated by the 'auth' middleware. This could allow a malicious authenticated user to attempt to buy tickets or record participation on behalf of another user.
Resolved
#3 high Issue
Insecure File Upload Practices
File uploads (draw images, ticket package level images, banner images) via 'multer' lack critical security controls: No file type validation (could allow upload of non-image files, e.g., scripts). No file size limits (could lead to DoS by uploading excessively large files). 'upload.any()' used in 'ticketRouter.ts' is too permissive.
Resolved
#4 high Issue
TypeScript Environment Needs Correction and Type Safety Improvements
The audit observed persistent TypeScript errors (e.g., 'Cannot find module mongoose/jsonwebtoken' in 'controllers/userController.ts' and other files, implicit 'any' types for 'jwt.sign' callback params in 'controllers/userController.ts' and other locations like 'ticketController.ts') likely due to missing or incorrect type definitions in 'package.json' and potentially 'tsconfig.json' settings. This impedes proper static analysis and type safety. 'strict: true' is enabled in 'tsconfig.json', so these 'any' types should be resolvable with correct setup and explicit typing.
Resolved
#5 high Issue
Missing API Rate Limiting
The application lacks API rate limiting. This exposes endpoints, particularly authentication ('/user/login') and resource-intensive ones like ticket purchasing ('/ticket/buyTicket'), to brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, and denial-of-service attempts by overwhelming the server with requests.
medium Issues | 7 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Potential IDOR in getAllCompetitionForUser
The 'getAllCompetitionForUser' function in 'controllers/userController.ts' uses 'walletAddress' from 'req.query' to fetch user data, allowing any authenticated user to potentially query competition data for any other user by modifying the query parameter.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Information Leakage via Detailed Error Messages
Many error handlers in controllers return raw error objects or stack traces to the client (e.g., 'res.status(500).json({ message: "...", error: error })'). This can expose internal application details, file paths, or library internals, aiding attackers.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Redundant Admin Authorization Checks
Several controller functions that are already protected by the 'adminAuth' middleware (e.g., in 'drawController', 'ticketController', 'bannerController', 'winnerController') repeat admin authorization logic by checking 'walletAddress' from 'req.body' and verifying 'user.role'. This is redundant and adds unnecessary code.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Ticket Reservation System Gaps
The ticket reservation system ('reserveTicket', 'cancelReservation' in 'controllers/ticketController.ts'): Does not appear to be user-specific (reservations are not tied to a 'userId'). Lacks explicit reservation timeouts. This could allow abuse (e.g., a malicious actor reserving all available tickets for a limited draw indefinitely if they are not explicitly cancelled or expire). The 'soldTickets' count in 'drawModel' might also be conflated with reserved tickets.
Resolved
#5 medium Issue
CORS Configuration Overly Permissive in Specific Cases
Socket.IO CORS is configured with 'cors: { origin: "*" }' in 'app.ts', which is too permissive. Static file serving for '/uploads' also sets 'res.set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")', which is too permissive.
Resolved
#6 medium Issue
JWT_SECRET Handling Runtime Error Risk
The use of the non-null assertion operator ('JWT_SECRET!') in 'middleware/auth.ts', 'middleware/adminAuth.ts', and 'controllers/userController.ts' when verifying or signing JWTs can lead to runtime errors if the 'JWT_SECRET' environment variable is not set. While 'utils/helper.ts' loads it from 'process.env', an explicit check at application startup for its presence is a safer pattern.
Resolved
#7 medium Issue
XSS Risk via Uploaded Image Content
Uploaded image files (for draws, ticket levels, banners) could pose an XSS risk if not properly sanitized before being rendered on the frontend, especially if file types like SVG are permitted or if images can contain malicious metadata that browsers might interpret. While primarily a frontend concern for rendering, backend can contribute by sanitizing uploads.
optimization Issues | 6 findings
Resolved
#1 optimization Issue
tsconfig.json Enhancements
Further 'tsconfig.json' enhancements include: setting 'outDir' for compiled output, enabling 'sourceMap' for easier debugging, enabling 'noUnusedLocals' and 'noUnusedParameters' for cleaner code, re-evaluating 'allowImportingTsExtensions' (standard practice is to omit extensions in imports), and considering a more modern JS 'target'.
Resolved
#2 optimization Issue
Add Unique Constraint for walletAddress
The 'walletAddress' field in 'models/usersModel.ts' should have a 'unique: true' constraint to ensure uniqueness at the database level, providing stronger data integrity beyond application-level checks.
Acknowledged
#3 optimization Issue
Enhance Dockerfile for Production
The current Dockerfile is suitable for development but should be enhanced for production by using multi-stage builds, removing development dependencies and tools from the final stage, running the application as a non-root user for security, and ensuring the CMD executes compiled JavaScript.
Acknowledged
#4 optimization Issue
package.json Enhancements (Build Scripts, Audit)
'package.json' should include 'build' and 'start:prod' scripts. It is also crucial for the user to run 'npm audit' (or 'yarn audit') to identify and remediate any known vulnerabilities in project dependencies. The 'helmet' version was noted as potentially unusual.
Resolved
#5 optimization Issue
Robust Database Connection Error Handling
In 'config/database.ts', if the initial database connection fails, the error is logged, but the application may continue to run. For a database-critical application, consider a more robust strategy such as exiting the process if the DB is unavailable at startup.
Resolved
#6 optimization Issue
Secure Logging Practices
Review logging statements to ensure sensitive information (e.g., full JWTs, verbose error objects in production responses to the client, or detailed internal states) is not unnecessarily logged or exposed. For example, logging the token itself in 'auth.ts' when a user is not found should be avoided.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Secure Admin User Creation Process
The process for creating administrative users (assigning the 'admin' role) is currently undefined within the auditable codebase. This must be a secure, controlled, and documented out-of-band process to prevent unauthorized elevation of privileges.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
HTTPS Enforcement in Production
Secure communication via HTTPS is critical for protecting data in transit but is a deployment-level concern, not directly part of the application code reviewed. It must be enforced in production environments using a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) or load balancer to terminate SSL. Implementing HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers is also recommended.