This initial security audit of the Web3 Raffle Platform's client-side codebase identified 9 distinct issues (excluding informational items) spanning critical transaction handling, cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, authentication token management, authorization enforcement, and WebSocket security. Our goal is to ensure that the development team understands the scope of work required to enhance the security posture of the frontend application.

The frontend application integrates with a backend API and the Solana blockchain. While the component structure is generally standard for a React application, the identified vulnerabilities, if unaddressed, could expose users to risks such as fund loss, session hijacking, and denial of service for certain features. A phased remediation plan focusing on the highest-risk areas is recommended. It is crucial to note that this audit was limited to the client-side code; a comprehensive security assessment must also include the backend API and any associated Solana smart contracts.

Technical Summary (Client-Side Findings)

• Critical Transaction Handling: A critical race condition was identified in the multi-step ticket purchase flow (Backend Reserve -> On-chain Pay -> Backend Confirm), potentially leading to users paying but not receiving tickets, or overselling.
• Web Security (XSS): A high-severity Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists due to rendering unsanitized HTML from draw descriptions via dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
• Authentication & Tokens: JWTs are stored in localStorage, making them vulnerable to XSS attacks and session hijacking. Incomplete logout logic was also noted upon client-side token expiry detection.
• Authorization: The application relies heavily on backend API enforcement for admin functionalities, as client-side role checks are primarily for UI and can be bypassed.
• Data Integrity & API Interaction: Potential for trusting client-side data (like ticket cost) in the purchase flow, requiring robust backend validation. Manual attachment of authorization headers is error-prone.
• Secure Communication: Insecure WebSocket configuration is possible if WSS is not enforced, and no explicit token-based authentication for the WebSocket connection itself was observed.

Key Recommendations (Client-Side)

• Ticket Purchase Flow: Implement robust transactional integrity in the backend for the ticket purchase process. The on-chain transaction should be the primary source of truth, or the backend needs atomic operations.
• XSS Prevention: Sanitize all HTML content derived from external sources (like draw descriptions) using a library like DOMPurify before rendering with dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
• Token Management: Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies. Ensure logout processes fully clear all authentication state.
• Authorization Enforcement: Reinforce that all backend API endpoints serving sensitive data or actions must rigorously validate JWTs and associated roles. Client-side checks are insufficient for security.
• Input and Price Validation: Backend systems must always re-validate critical data like prices and quantities against authoritative sources before finalizing transactions.
• API Call Security: Implement an Axios request interceptor for consistent and secure attachment of authorization headers.
• WebSocket Security: Ensure WebSocket connections use WSS and implement token-based authentication for the connection.

Recommended Remediation Focus (Client-Side)

1. Critical Vulnerability Remediation:
   • Address the race condition in the TicketPage.tsx purchase flow by redesigning the backend logic for atomicity and reliability, potentially making the on-chain transaction the definitive record or using a robust distributed lock/transactional system for the reserve-pay-confirm sequence.
2. High Severity Vulnerability Remediation:
   • Implement HTML sanitization (e.g., DOMPurify) for draftToHtml output in TicketPage.tsx to prevent XSS.
   • Transition JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies to protect against XSS-based token theft.
   • Review and ensure all backend endpoints correctly authorize requests based on validated JWT claims, especially for admin functionalities.
3. Medium & Low Severity Vulnerability Remediation:
   • Strengthen backend validation for all client-provided data, especially financial transaction parameters like 'cost'.
   • Ensure the logout process in UserContext is comprehensively triggered upon token expiry detection in useCheckAuthRedirect.
   • Secure WebSocket communications (enforce WSS, implement JWT-based auth for the socket connection).
   • Refactor API calls to use an Axios interceptor for setting Authorization headers.

Note: This report summary covers only the client-side code of the Web3 Raffle Platform. No review of the backend API or Solana smart contracts was performed as part of this specific analysis. These components are critical to the overall security of the platform and require their own dedicated security audits. We recommend integrating these findings into your development backlog and verifying remediation with follow-up reviews before any production launch or significant updates.