WealthX 2.O Info
Wealth-X is a decentralized ecosystem designed to provide users with various income-generating opportunities by utilizing a multi-tiered model. It leverages blockchain technology, specifically built on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC), to ensure fast, secure, and cost-efficient transactions. The platform's approach combines both active and passive income strategies to empower users to build wealth over time.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no ownership privileges in the contract. The owner can only renounce the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the WealthX 2.0 smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the WealthX 2.0 team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Timestamp Dependency for Critical Functionality.
The contract introduces a critical timestamp dependency issue by changing the day calculation from 24 hours to 10 minutes. This drastic reduction enables users to claim rewards 144 times more frequently than intended, causing rapid fund depletion and economic imbalance. The entire reward system—including booster, ensure, leadership, and royalty pools—operates on "daily" cycles, but now processes in 10-minute increments, accelerating rank progression and allowing premature fund distribution. To mitigate this vulnerability, the contract should restore the original time calculation using the standard day unit (1 days = 86400 seconds). If shorter intervals are needed for testing, the contract should include a configurable timeframe parameter that can be adjusted between test and production environments, along with proportional adjustments to reward rates. Additionally, implementing a deployment flag to enforce proper time settings in production would prevent accidental deployment of test configurations.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Inconsistent Fund Distribution in updateFunds.
The updateFunds function employs inconsistent fund distribution strategies across different pools. While the booster fund receives a 50/50 split between the current and next days (lines 433-436), other pools like ensure, leadership and royalty receive 100% allocation to the current day only. This temporal inconsistency creates predictability challenges, potential exploitation opportunities at day boundaries, and uneven reward distribution patterns. Users familiar with this mechanism gain strategic advantages, while the general ecosystem experiences varying liquidity profiles across different reward pools. To mitigate this issue, implement one of three solutions: 1) standardise all pools to use the same temporal distribution pattern (either all 50/50 or all 100% current day), 2) add configuration parameters allowing adjustable split ratios per pool type, or 3) if the inconsistency is intentional, document it clearly with supporting economic rationale, ensuring transparency for all participants in the ecosystem.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
MAX_REFERRALS Limit Removal.
This removal creates serious risks including unbounded storage growth, potential gas limit violations in functions that iterate through referral lists, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities where popular referrers could become unusable due to excessive gas costs. The issue is particularly concerning with the new royalty system which depends heavily on referral relationships and creates additional unbounded arrays with _myFourStars[address]. To remediate this issue, the contract should reintroduce the MAX_REFERRALS constant with an appropriate upper bound and restore the enforcement check in the registerUser function. Similar limits should also be considered for the _myFourStars array to prevent cascading unbounded growth.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Royalty System Exploitation.
The royalty mechanism rewards users whose direct referrals reach rank 4, requiring significant legitimate network building and investment from all participants. The system includes appropriate constraints like requiring users to be ranked four themselves, having daily reward caps, and sequential claiming processes. While strategic participation is possible, this represents normal behaviour in an MLM-style reward structure. To improve transparency, the contract documentation should clearly explain the royalty system mechanics and intended incentive structure to avoid user misinterpretation.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Use safeERC20 instead of ERC20.
mplement using SafeERC20 for IERC20 and replace all transfer/transferFrom calls with safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom to ensure transactions either succeed completely or revert, protecting user funds from potential token implementation issues.