Smart Contract Analysis Statement

Contract Analysis

The ATSGasCollector v2 contract is a revision of the previously audited collector on BSC that takes ATS from a holder as payment for gas that is spent on another chain. Every collection now requires the holder's EIP-712 signature over the exact amount, a settlement id, the destination chain, the treasury and a deadline. The collector role decides only who may submit such a signature. The collected ATS goes directly to the treasury and never stays in the contract. For every settlement id the contract records who paid and how much, so each id can be used once and settlements can be reconciled on-chain. The re-audit covered the source verified on Sourcify with an exact match on BSC testnet.

Ownership Privileges

The ownership is held through a two-step handover. On the v2 testnet deployment the owner and the treasury are the deploying EOA; for mainnet the team intends the 2-of-3 Safe that owns the legacy contracts. The owner retains the following privileges:

• Adding and removing collectors
• Changing the treasury, which can be neither the zero address, nor the contract itself, nor the ATS token; a change invalidates all outstanding authorisations because the treasury is part of every signature
• Setting the per-call cap, which can never exceed the hard-coded ceiling of 1,000 ATS
• Pausing and resuming all collection
• The owner and the collectors cannot move ATS without a matching holder signature, and the owner cannot renounce ownership
• No owner action takes effect with a delay, as no timelock is in place

Security Features

The contract implements several positive security features:

• Holder-signed EIP-712 authorisations bound to amount, settlement id, destination chain, treasury, deadline, chain id and contract address
• Signatures are verified without reverting through ECDSA.tryRecover, malleable high-s signatures are rejected and compact EIP-2098 signatures are supported
• A settlement id can be collected only once, and the payer and amount are recorded for every id
• A hard-coded ceiling of 1,000 ATS per collection that even the owner cannot raise
• Checks-effects-interactions order, SafeERC20 transfers, an immutable token address, custom errors and a pinned compiler version

Re-audit Outcome

The high-severity issue is fixed in the v2 contract: in testing, neither a collector key without the holder's signature nor an owner that redirects the treasury and whitelists itself could take any ATS, and tampered, replayed and expired authorisations all reverted. The settlement binding, the constructor naming, the English documentation and the custom errors are also fixed. A compromised collector key can still occupy an unused settlement id with a tiny self-signed payment, which the contract documents and which the payment record exposes. No new vulnerability was introduced by the changes, and Slither and Aderyn reported no new valid issue. Important for the live system: the v2 collector is so far only deployed on BSC testnet. The legacy collector on BSC mainnet is unchanged and still active, with its production collector key authorised and a per-call cap of 150 ATS; the revocation announced on 2026-10-18 removed a different, unused key. Until users have migrated and revoked their approvals to the legacy collector, the original risk to approved balances remains on mainnet.

Note - This re-audit report consists of a security analysis of the ATSGasCollector v2 smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the ATSGasCollector team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.