ViFoxCoin Info
ViFox Coin is built on transparency, security, and trust. Our smart contract has been independently audited by a top-tier blockchain security firm, confirming zero critical vulnerabilities and full compliance with best practices. Dive into our documentation to understand how ViFox Coin empowers a decentralized, reward-based Web3 economy.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can grant and revoke the ADMIN_ROLE.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can grant and revoke the MINTER_ROLE.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can pause and unpause the contract.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can change the daily minting limit.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can transfer its own administrative role to another address.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can manually reset the daily minting counter.
- The MINTER_ROLE can whitelist user addresses for minting.
- The MINTER_ROLE can mint new tokens to whitelisted addresses.
- The MINTER_ROLE can whitelist addresses to mint tokens.
The project designates a multi-signature wallet as the contract owner. All ownership privileges—including executing critical operations, managing configuration parameters, and authorizing sensitive actions—will require multi-party approval through the multi-signature mechanism. This structure ensures enhanced security, minimizes single-point-of-failure risks, and maintains transparent, controlled governance over all owner-level functions.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the VifoxCoin smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the VifoxCoin team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Administrator Can Indefinitely Lock All Staked User Funds
The unstake function is blocked when the contract is paused due to the whenNotPaused modifier. This gives the ADMIN_ROLE holder the unilateral ability to freeze all staked assets. By calling pause(), an administrator can instantly prevent all users from withdrawing their staked tokens. This action traps both the principal and any accrued rewards, creating a situation where a single compromised or malicious admin can hold user funds hostage indefinitely. This represents a critical centralization risk that undermines user trust and asset security.
low Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing Input Validation for Zero Addresses
The constructor initializes the contract by minting tokens to several addresses (collegeWallet and accounts within the allocations array). However, it does not check if any of these addresses are the zero address (address(0)). While the underlying _mint function would likely revert the transaction, failing to include explicit checks is against best practices and can lead to wasted gas on failed deployments with less clear error messages.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Potential for Deployment Failure with Large Initial Allocations
The constructor iterates through an allocations array to mint tokens and set up vesting schedules for initial stakeholders. If this array contains a very large number of addresses, the cumulative gas cost of the loop could exceed the block gas limit. This would cause the contract deployment transaction to fail, making it impossible to launch the token with the intended initial distribution in a single transaction.
informational Issues | 4 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Reduced On-Chain Transparency due to Missing Event
This function allows an admin to modify a critical economic parameter—the daily cap on minting new tokens. However, this state change is performed silently without emitting an on-chain event. This lack of an event record reduces transparency and makes it significantly more difficult for users, analytics platforms, and other monitoring services to track important changes to the token's issuance policy.
Acknowledged
#3 informational Issue
Token Theft by Minter via Unverified Recipient Wallet
The transferVFX minting function contains a critical flaw where it fails to verify that the recipient userWallet address is the one officially registered to the userId. The function validates the userId but blindly trusts the recipient address provided by the minter. This allows a malicious or compromised minter to steal tokens by using a valid userId to pass the check but routing the newly minted tokens to their own wallet.
Acknowledged
#4 informational Issue
User ID Hijacking and Fund Diversion via Overwritable Registration
The registerUser function does not prevent an existing userId from being re-registered to a new wallet address. It only checks if the wallet address itself is unique. This allows a malicious minter to hijack a user's ID by overwriting their on-chain registration with a new wallet. This permanently diverts all future funds intended for the original user to the attacker's address.