VerticalAI Info

Vertical pioneers the future of AI by combining no-code AI customization with decentralized infrastructure providers for seamless scalability and innovation. The No-Code Platform for AI Model Fine-Tuning. Train, deploy, and monetize AI models effortlessly through their integrated marketplace!

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Team and KYC Verification

The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.

In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.

TrustNet Score

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93.63
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

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Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0xf15d...9D95
Network
Ethereum - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2026/03/26
Revision date 2026/03/26

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is upgradeable

The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges
VerticalAIStaking.sol
  • The owner can create a new reward epoch by calling createEpoch(), setting the end time and reward pool size that will govern cashback distribution for all stakers during that period.
  • The owner can forcibly end the current epoch early by calling endEpoch(), which immediately sets the epoch's end time to the current block timestamp, potentially stranding rewards in the final snapshot.
  • The owner can process and finalize epoch auto-push by calling processEpochAutoPush(), which batch-settles cashback rewards for all participants of a completed epoch and marks it as finalized — a prerequisite that must be completed before any new epoch can be created.
  • The owner can adjust cashback eligibility thresholds by calling setCashbackMinThresholds(), changing the minimum VERTAI token balance and minimum USD value required for a staker to participate in reward distribution, affecting every current and future staker's eligibility.
  • The owner can replace the price oracle by calling setPriceOracle(), swapping the contract used to convert VERTAI amounts to USD for cashback eligibility checks, with immediate effect on all subsequent eligibility evaluations.
  • The owner can replace or remove the weight contract by calling setWeightContract(), redirecting or disconnecting the hook that records staking events into the off-chain weight scoring system, immediately affecting all future stake() and unstake() calls.
  • The owner can pause all user-facing operations by calling pause(), blocking stake(), unstake(), and claimCashback() for every user simultaneously.
  • The owner can unpause the contract by calling unpause(), restoring access to all user-facing functions.
  • The owner can toggle emergency mode by calling setEmergencyMode(true/false), which is the only way to unlock emergencyUserWithdraw() for stakers — without this flag set to true, users have no exit path if the contract is paused.
  • The owner can drain the entire contract token balance by calling emergencyWithdraw(), transferring all staked tokens to the owner address with no requirement for emergency mode to be active, no timelock, and no per-user consent.
  • The owner can upgrade the contract implementation via UUPS by calling upgradeTo(), replacing the proxy's logic with any new implementation in a single transaction with no timelock or delay.
VerticalAIWeight.sol
  • The owner can start a new weight snapshot by calling startSnapshot(), opening a snapshot session that captures every known user's materialized weight at that point in time for off-chain reward distribution purposes.
  • The owner can finalize a completed snapshot by calling finalizeSnapshot(), marking the snapshot as immutable and closing the active session — required before a new snapshot can be started.
  • The owner can update the token emission rate by calling setEmissionRate(), changing the rate at which eligible tokens accrue weight per second, with the change taking effect immediately and being recorded as a new rate checkpoint for all future weight calculations.
  • The owner can adjust the weekly unlock cap by calling setWeeklyCap(), changing the maximum number of newly staked (locked) tokens that transition into the weight-earning eligible pool per weekly tranche, affecting all users' unlock schedules going forward.
  • The owner can replace the authorized staking contract by calling setStakingContract(), changing which address is permitted to call the onStake() and onUnstake() hooks — immediately orphaning any existing staking contract's ability to update weight state.
  • The owner can upgrade the weight contract implementation via UUPS by calling upgradeTo(), replacing the proxy's logic with any new implementation in a single transaction with no timelock or delay.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Vertical AI smart contract. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Vertical AI team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

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Findings and Audit result

low Issues | 2 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Reward Pool Burned When activeEligibleTotal == 0 at Snapshot Boundary
VerticalAIStaking.sol
L573-579
Description

In _processPendingSnapshots(), distributed += uint128(rewardForSnapshot) is incremented unconditionally, even when activeEligibleTotal == 0 and accRewardPerToken is left unchanged. This means the snapshot's reward is counted as distributed but never actually credited to any user. The remaining reward pool for future snapshots is calculated as rewardPool - distributed, so these phantom distributions permanently reduce what eligible stakers can claim.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
emergencyUserWithdraw() Skips weightContract.onUnstake() — Ghost Weight Inflation on Re-Stake
VerticalAIStaing.sol
L270-289
Description

emergencyUserWithdraw() zeroes staking state but does not synchronize weight state. This can create stale weight totals if users later re-stake.

optimization Issues | 1 findings

Acknowledged

#1 optimization Issue
getLiveTotalWeight() Unbounded O(N) Loop — View Function Gas DoS at Scale
VerticalAIStaking.sol
L251-256
Description

Live total weight computation iterates across all known users and can become expensive at large scale.

informational Issues | 2 findings

Acknowledged

#1 informational Issue
epochEligibleActiveTotal Initialized to totalStaked — Eligible Stakers Systematically Under-Rewarded
VerticalAIStaking.sol
L406
Description

At epoch creation, denominator is initialized from totalStaked. This is considered intentional economics under current protocol design assumptions.

Acknowledged

#2 informational Issue
setWeightContract() to Fresh Deploy Immediately Blocks All Existing Stakers from Unstaking
VerticalAIStaking.sol
L503-511
Description

Switching to a fresh weight contract can require coordinated operations to prevent temporary unstake friction for existing users.