UNMIX ECOSYSTEM Info
The AI and robotics revolution isn't a distant promise—it's happening right now. UNMIX is on a mission to redefine everyday life by developing state-of-the-art personal assistant and security AI robots. By leveraging Web3 technology, we ensure absolute transparency and true ownership for our entire community. We aren't just pushing the boundaries of technology; we are building a robust, ever-expanding ecosystem where our early backers reap the greatest rewards. Join the official pUNMIX presale to secure your stake in the industry of tomorrow before our Token Generation Event (TGE), and lock in the exclusive price advantage reserved for early adopters. The train is leaving the station. Don't get left behind!
Team and KYC Verification
The KYC verification for this project is currently in progress.
The team has submitted their information and verification is pending.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The UNMIX contract implements an ERC20 token with a fixed total supply that is minted once to the deployer and cannot be changed afterwards. While the overall design follows common patterns on Ethereum, a few areas need attention:
- The contract inherits an ownership feature, but no function actually uses it - the owner cannot mint, burn, pause, tax, or freeze anything. This is harmless for behavior but can mislead users into assuming admin powers that do not exist.
- Ownership transfer happens in a single step, so a wrong or mistyped address would take over the (currently powerless) ownership role with no way to recover it.
- The source was shipped as a single flattened file with floating compiler version constraints and unused leftover code, which slightly enlarges the review surface and is a reproducibility concern for any future redeployment.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been transferred to an externally owned account that uses an account-delegation, rather than a multisig wallet. The owner retains the following, very limited, capabilities:
- Transfer the ownership role to another address.
- Renounce the ownership role entirely.
- Read the current owner through the public owner view.
- Nothing else - the role is not wired into any token logic.
- The owner cannot mint new tokens; the supply is permanently fixed.
- The owner cannot burn, freeze, or seize tokens from any holder.
- The owner cannot pause transfers, set fees, or blacklist addresses.
- The owner cannot upgrade or replace the contract code; it is immutable.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- A fixed, immutable supply with no mint or burn entry point, removing any inflation or hidden-mint risk.
- It is built on a widely used, well-reviewed token library, and it passed a full conformance check for the token standard.
- It performs no external calls and has no transfer callbacks, so there is no reentrancy surface to exploit.
- It is not upgradeable and uses a standard storage layout, so its behavior cannot be silently changed after deployment.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the UNMIX smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the UNMIX team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Single-step ownership transfer
The token uses a single-step ownership transfer. Calling transfer ownership moves the role immediately to whatever address is provided, with no confirmation from the receiving account. A mistyped or wrong address would hand the role to an account nobody controls, with no way to recover it. The practical impact is small here because the owner has no power over the token itself, so this mainly affects the (currently inert) ownership handle rather than user funds.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Ownership held by an externally owned account
Ownership is currently held by a regular externally owned account that has installed an account-delegation, rather than by a multisig wallet. For any privileged role the recommended practice is a multisig or a timelock to avoid single-key control. In this specific contract the owner has no ability to change balances, supply, or transfers, so the present risk is negligible and the note is raised mainly for completeness and for any future upgrade that grants the owner real powers.
optimization Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Non-payable constructor
The constructor is not marked payable, which adds a small value check during deployment. A payable constructor would save a minor amount of gas at deploy time. Since the contract is already live and immutable, this is only relevant if a new version is deployed later.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Compound assignment on a storage variable
The supply update uses a compound add-assign on a storage value, which is marginally more expensive than reading the value into memory, adding, and writing it back. The line is part of the well-known token library that the contract reuses unchanged, so the saving is negligible and altering vendored library code is not recommended.
Pending
#3 optimization Issue
Unused error definitions inflate contract size
Because the source was flattened into one file, it carries error definitions for unrelated token standards that this contract never uses. They add to the reviewed surface and to the artifact size without providing any function. Building from package imports rather than a flattened blob would remove them.
informational Issues | 6 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Ownership grants no authority over the token
The contract sets an owner at deployment but no function is restricted to that owner. The owner cannot mint, burn, pause, tax, freeze, or otherwise influence the token in any way. This is harmless in terms of behavior and is actually positive for holders, but it is misleading: it implies administrative powers that do not exist, and a future decision to renounce ownership could be presented as a decentralization milestone even though it changes nothing.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Floating and inconsistent compiler version constraints
The flattened source mixes several wide version constraints across its sections. Wide or floating version pragmas allow the same source to be compiled with a different compiler than the one that was reviewed and deployed, which is a reproducibility concern for future redeployments. The deployed bytecode itself was produced with a fixed compiler and is not affected.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Dead code carried in from flattening
The flattened file includes internal helpers and error definitions that this token never uses, such as the internal burn path and meta-transaction helpers, alongside errors for unrelated token standards. These do not create a security problem but increase the amount of code a reviewer has to consider and the size of the deployed artifact.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Missing documentation on the token contract
The token contract, its supply constant, and its constructor have no descriptive documentation. Clear notes explaining that the supply is fixed, minted once to the deployer, and that the owner has no special powers would make the intent obvious to reviewers and integrators and prevent wrong assumptions about hidden admin capabilities.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Standard approval race condition
The standard approval function overwrites the existing allowance, which exposes the well-known race where a spender, through transaction ordering, can spend both the old and the new allowance. This is expected behavior for a standard token of this kind and is not a defect introduced by this contract. It is noted so that integrators handle allowance changes carefully.
Pending
#6 informational Issue
Large numeric literal without scientific notation
The total supply is written as a long multiplication of grouped digits. While readable, very large literals are easy to miscount when edited by hand, and exponent notation would be clearer. The on-chain supply was checked and matches the intended value, so this is purely a readability suggestion.