Trez Info
The TREZ decentralized mining protocol represents a new era of blockchain- native mining and token distribution. Unlike conventional cryptocurrencies, where mining operations are often dominated by specialized hardware or centralized pools, TREZ enforces a transparent and immutable on- chain mining process. All key mechanisms —including reward emission, difficulty adjustment, referral incentives, vesting releases, and the final reward —are locked permanently into the smart contract.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no admin or ownership privilges.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the Staking contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the token’s logic. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the token.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 4 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Initialization Front-Running (DoS Vector)
The vesting program derives the unique address for a vesting schedule using fixed seeds (the mint and beneficiary address), meaning only one schedule can ever exist for a given user-token pair. This creates a Denial-of-Service vulnerability where a malicious actor can monitor the network for pending vesting transactions and "front-run" them by initializing the schedule first with a negligible amount and an extremely long lockup period. Since the program prevents re-initialization, the legitimate transaction will fail, and the intended beneficiary's wallet address becomes permanently unusable for receiving vesting grants for that token, forcing them to generate a new wallet.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Frozen Funds Risk (No Sweep Mechanism)
The program strictly calculates claimable amounts based on the amount_total stored in the state account, ignoring the actual token balance of the vault. If a user accidentally transfers extra tokens to the vault address (manually), or if the initialize transaction is constructed incorrectly such that the vault is pre-funded with too much, the excess tokens become permanently locked. There is no function to withdraw "excess" funds.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Operational Fragility (Vault Setup)
The instructions require the vault token account to be created outside the transaction (passed as an initialized account). This relies on client-side scripts to correctly create the account and assign ownership to the PDA. If the user creates the vault but fails to call initialize (e.g., transaction drops), the vault exists but is uncontrolled. If they try to "fix" it by calling initialize later, the init constraint (if they used Anchor init) would fail, or if they manually funded it, they risk the "Frozen Funds" issue above.
Pending
#4 medium Issue
Frozen Funds Risk
The initialization logic transfers amount_total from the funder to the vault without checking if the vault is empty. A user, misunderstanding the flow, might manually create the vault and fund it with tokens before calling initialize (thinking they need to set it up first). When they call initialize, the program transfers another batch of tokens (amount_total) into the vault. The vault now holds double the tokens (or manual + amount). However, the vesting state only tracks amount_total. The excess tokens are permanently locked in the vault with no way to withdraw them, as there is no "sweep" or "withdraw excess" function.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
No Rent Reclamation (Resource Leak)
Even after all tokens are claimed (amount_released == amount_total), the vesting account and the token vault remain on-chain, occupying storage (SOL rent). The rent SOL (likely ~0.005 SOL per account) is locked forever.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Immutable Beneficiary (Operational Risk)
The beneficiary key is hardcoded into the state upon initialization and effectively acts as part of the seed. There is no function to update or rotate the beneficiary key. If the beneficiary's wallet is compromised or they lose their private key, the remaining vested tokens are irretrievable. There is no "admin" or "funder" override to rescue the funds (which is often desired in corporate vesting).
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Unused Account
The vault_owner account is included in the validation struct and checked (constraint = ...), but it is never used in the function body. Initialization sends tokens to the vault, so the vault's authority (the PDA) does not need to sign.