Trabajo24 Info
T24 revolutionizes our freelancer escrow payments with blockchain technology. Our platform in Paraguay offers instant payroll payments and streamlined escrow processes through inswitch. Developed by experts, our DeFi automation ensures secure transactions with minimal manual intervention. Partnering withindustry leaders ensures governance, fraud detection, and AML compliance. Join Trabajo24 for secure and efficient freelancer payments.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
TrustNet DataPulse
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The platform role can create/cancel/close the escrows in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Trabajo24 Escrow smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contracts for the Trabajo24 team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 high Issue
Double Transfer of Tokens
In the createEscrow function, the transferFrom function is called twice, The first transferFrom transfers amountUSD tokens from msg.sender to the contract. The second transferFrom attempts to transfer the same amount again. This results in double the intended amount being transferred from the sender's account. If the sender does not have enough tokens to cover the second transfer, the transaction will fail.
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
The createEscrow function does not check whether the sender has approved the contract to spend the required amount of tokens on their behalf. This is a critical security and usability issue because the function will fail if the allowance is insufficient, but it won't provide a clear error message to the user.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The TEscrow contract lacks reentrancy protection, making it vulnerable to attacks where malicious contracts could re-enter functions during token transfers. To fix this, inherit from OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard and apply the nonReentrant modifier to functions like createEscrow, cancelEscrow, and closeEscrow. This prevents reentrant calls by locking the function during execution. Additionally, ensure proper access control with access.onlyPlatform("TEscrow") to restrict sensitive actions to authorized roles. These changes enhance security by safeguarding against reentrancy attacks and unauthorized access, ensuring the contract operates safely when interacting with external tokens like USDT.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing Escrow Existence Check
The function does not check if the escrowID exists in the escrows mapping. Accessing a non-existent escrow will return default values (clientID = 0, jobID = 0, amountUSD = 0, etc.), which could lead to unexpected behavior. escrow.amountUSD will be 0, causing the transfer function to send 0 tokens. The function will not revert, but it will emit an event and update the state unnecessarily. Add a check to ensure the escrow exists.