TGBW Info
The meme coin with the punch. Join the jungle and experience the wildest crypto adventure with $TGBW.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can withdraw tokens to the destination address.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the locker contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the token’s logic. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the token.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Centralized Treasury Control with an Exposed Private Key
The withdraw function is critically flawed because the authority over the reward pool funds, reward_pool_wallet, is defined as a Signer instead of a Program Derived Address (PDA). This design choice requires the wallet's private key to be stored off-chain and used to sign every withdrawal transaction, creating a single point of failure and a major security risk. For example, if the server or machine holding this private key is compromised, an attacker can steal the key, giving them full authority to sign transactions and drain the entire reward pool of its funds.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Lack of Input Validation Leading to Failed or Pointless Transactions
The withdraw function is missing several key input validation checks, which makes it brittle and inefficient. Firstly, it does not check if the withdrawal amount is greater than zero, allowing a user to execute a transaction with amount = 0, which performs no action but still costs them transaction fees. Secondly, it does not validate that the reward_pool_ata and the destination_ata belong to the same token mint. For example, if the reward pool holds USDC and a user provides a BONK token account as the destination, the transaction will fail deep inside the token program with a generic error instead of a clear, actionable one.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Misleading and Manipulable Event Log
The withdraw function logs the destination public key from the instruction arguments in the Withdrawal event, but it sends the tokens to the destination_ata account provided separately. The contract fails to validate that the destination pubkey is the actual owner of the destination_ata. This creates a loophole where the on-chain event log can be made to lie about who received the funds. For example, the contract owner could send tokens to Bob's token account (destination_ata) while providing Charlie's public key as the destination argument. The tokens would go to Bob, but the immutable on-chain log would incorrectly and permanently state that Charlie was the recipient, making the audit trail untrustworthy.