TapDaDoge Info
TapDaDoge promises an easily accessible, endlessly entertaining and rewarding experience. The player (You) takes control of their NFT Characters to jump over obstacles and in the process, earns various types of Points, which can be used in exchange for more goodies. The game is meant to have simple and intuitive mechanics that are tough to master but highly rewarding. Now, let’s get acquainted with our main cast of Characters (NFTs). Below are a limited sample of our Furry Friends, also known as “Doges”. You’ll notice that they have each been assigned a designation (e.g. “Unique”, “Legendary”, et cetera.).
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
PointToToken.sol
- The owner can set the treasury address.
- The owner can update various configuration parameters, including fee percentage, user and global daily claim limits, signature validity duration, manual approve threshold, and minimum claim amount.
- The owner can add or remove authorized signers.
- The owner can add or remove manual approval administrators.
- The admin can approve the
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the TapDaDoge smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the TapDaDoge team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Cross-Chain Signature Replay Vulnerability
The claim function's signature verification doesn't include chain-specific or contract-specific data, creating a vulnerability where a valid signature used on one blockchain network or contract deployment could be reused on another. For instance, if Alice signs a message for Bob to claim 100 tokens on Ethereum, Bob could potentially replay this exact signature on Polygon or another chain where the same contract is deployed with Alice as an authorized signer. This occurs because the signed hash only contains user address, amount, timestamp, and nonce—all transferable across chains. To mitigate this risk, incorporate block.chainid and address(this) into the signature hash: keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.chainid, address(this), msg.sender, amount, timestamp, nonce)). This ensures signatures are uniquely bound to a specific blockchain and contract instance, following best practices established by EIP-712 for typed structured data signing.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Potential DoS from Limits
The claim function implements both user-specific and global daily claim limits through the userDailyClaimLimit and globalDailyClaimLimit variables. When the global limit is reached on a given day, all subsequent claim attempts will fail with the error "Total daily withdrawal limit reached," regardless of which user initiates them. This creates a denial-of-service vulnerability where users who attempt to claim later in the day may be consistently blocked if other users have already consumed the entire global allocation. Early users could potentially exhaust the limit intentionally or unintentionally, preventing others from accessing the system until the next day. To mitigate this risk, consider implementing a queue system for claims that exceed the daily limit, allowing them to be processed automatically the following day, or implement a priority-based system that reserves portions of the global limit for different user tiers. Alternatively, you could design a dynamic limit system that adjusts based on time of day to ensure fair distribution of claim opportunities throughout the day.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Insufficient Signature Parameters
The signature only contains the user address and amount, lacking critical elements like timestamp, nonce, or chain-specific identifiers. This simplified hash leaves the signature vulnerable to replay attacks. Without a timestamp or nonce, a valid signature can be reused indefinitely until manually marked as used. Include additional parameters in the signature
low Issues | 4 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Potential Logical Conflicts Between Parameters
There's no validation ensuring that _userDailyClaimLimit isn't greater than _globalDailyClaimLimit, which could create a logical inconsistency in the system. Add checks to ensure parameter values are logically consistent with each other.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Improper Order of Operations
The function updates state variables (usedSignatures, lastNonce) before verifying that claim limits haven't been exceeded, potentially leaving state inconsistent if later checks fail. Reorder operations to validate all requirements before updating any state.
Pending
#4 low Issue
State Changes Before Validation Checks
The function updates state variables before verifying claim limits. If the daily limit check fails, the signature is already marked as used, potentially causing transaction failures. Perform all validations before updating state.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.