TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.
TrustNet DataPulse
We are presently engaged in detailed discussions with our partners to finalize the arrangements. Information regarding presales will be made available on this platform in the near future. We appreciate your patience and look forward to sharing the upcoming opportunities with you soon!
We are currently in discussions with our partners to finalize the details. Information on token locking and vesting schedules will be provided on this platform soon. We appreciate your patience and look forward to sharing these upcoming opportunities with you shortly.
In the meantime, we’ve already integrated the LP lock overview from UNCX.network. Please visit the CEX/DEX tab for more information.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can enable/disable presale.
- The operator can create the presale.
- The operator can change the sale times.
- The owner can change the presale price.
- The admin can update the threshold bonus.
- The admin can withdraw ETH and USDT from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the TAN ICO smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the TAN team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Lack of claim functionality
The absence of a claim functionality in the ICO contract raises concerns about transparency, user trust, and decentralization. Without a claim mechanism, users cannot explicitly withdraw their purchased tokens, creating centralization risks as the owner retains control over token distribution. This lack of clarity can deter participants and potentially lead to regulatory non-compliance. To address this, the contract should implement either a claim function allowing users to withdraw tokens post-sale or automate token distribution during deposits. Emitting events like TokensClaimed can enhance transparency. Implementing these features ensures trust, user satisfaction, and adherence to best practices in token sales.
low Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Lack of Validation for State Change
The function does not check whether the new value of _enable is the same as the current value (prevValue). This allows redundant updates where the state remains unchanged. If presale[_id].enableBuyWithEth is already true and _enable is also true, executing the function is unnecessary and wastes gas. Add a condition to check for changes before updating.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Acknowledged
#3 low Issue
Lack of Bounds on _bonusPercent
There is no upper bound on _bonusPercent, which could result in excessively large bonus percentages that could deplete the token supply or disrupt the presale. The only validation is that _bonusPercent must be greater than 0. An admin could set a bonus percentage of 10,000% (100x tokens) by mistake or malicious intent. Add an upper limit for _bonusPercent to avoid this issue in the contract.
Acknowledged
#4 low Issue
Redundant Updates
The function allows updating the threshold and bonus percentage even if the new values are the same as the existing ones, wasting gas. In the _isUpdate branch, there’s no check to see if _threshold or _bonusPercent differ from the existing values in bonusThresholds[_thresholdIndex]. To mitigate this, add checks to prevent redundant updates.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 optimization Issue
Gas intensive logic
The updateThresholdBonus function currently relies on an array to manage bonus thresholds, which introduces inefficiency as the list grows. Each addition requires iterating through the array to validate the new threshold, resulting in higher gas costs. To address this, implementing a mapping-based structure is recommended. Mappings allow direct access to thresholds by their identifiers, eliminating the need for iterative checks and significantly reducing computational overhead. This optimization not only lowers gas consumption but also enhances scalability and performance, ensuring the system remains efficient even with a larger set of thresholds.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended that the unused code be removed from the contract.