STENIX Info
An innovative blockchain platform that integrates farming, staking, swaps, a lending market, token generation, crowdfunding, DAOs, an NFT marketplace, arbitrage, gamification, asset insurance, EVM-based predictions, asset tokenization, and a built-in exchange into a unified ecosystem.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The MINTER_ROLE can mint new tokens to an indefinite value, which is set to the bridge contract.
- The BURNER_ROLE can burn tokens from other wallets, which is set to the bridge contract.
- The owner can grant or revoke the bridge role in the contract.
- The owner can pause the minting and burning functionality in the contract.
The project designates a multi-signature wallet as the contract owner. All ownership privileges—including executing critical operations, managing configuration parameters, and authorizing sensitive actions—will require multi-party approval through the multi-signature mechanism. This structure ensures enhanced security, minimizes single-point-of-failure risks, and maintains transparent, controlled governance over all owner-level functions.
This contract is also deployed to the Ethereum network:
https://etherscan.io/address/0x699713E72F6c7585113E44BC39075d19F15Ee6C3#code
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Stenix smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Stenix team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Centralization of Power in Role Assignment Creates a Single Point of Failure
The critical vulnerability in this contract stems from the owner's unchecked power to grant minting and burning roles to any address, including personal wallets (Externally Owned Accounts), through the grantBridgeRoles function. This creates a severe centralization risk, as there are no safeguards to ensure these powerful permissions are restricted to a legitimate bridge contract. If the owner's account were compromised or used maliciously, they could assign these roles to an account under their control, enabling the unlimited creation of new tokens—triggering hyperinflation and collapsing the token's value—or the arbitrary destruction of tokens from any user's wallet. This design flaw establishes the owner's account as a single point of failure, fundamentally undermining the trust, security, and decentralized principles of the entire token ecosystem.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended to remove the unused code from the contract.