StakeX Info
StakeX is a decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem engineered to redefine the interaction between financial innovation and social responsibility. Financial Innovation Social Responsibility. Our platform uniquely blends robust passive income generation through advanced staking mechanisms, verifiable charitable impact, and truly decentralized community governance. O ur mission is to bridge the gap between profit and purpose, establishing a transparent and efficient model where every transaction contributes to global betterment.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can exempt wallets from fees.
- The owner can set the liquidity pool address.
- The Dev wallet can claim the vested tokens.
- The owner can initialize the vesting period only once.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the StakeX smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the StakeX team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 4 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing Contract Validation in setPresaleAddress Function
The setPresaleAddress function in the StakeX.sol smart contract is designed to set the address of the presale contract and transfer the allocated presale tokens to it. The current implementation lacks a critical validation to ensure that the address passed to the function is indeed a smart contract. An owner could inadvertently provide an Externally Owned Account (EOA) instead of a contract address. If this occurs, the presale tokens would be transferred to the EOA, from which they cannot be recovered or managed as intended by the presale logic. This would lead to a permanent loss of the presale token supply and disrupt the tokenomics of the project, as functions like initializeVesting depend on the presale contract to function correctly.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Redundant and Restrictive Access Control
The function uses both the onlyOwner modifier and a require(msg.sender == devWallet, ...) check. This means the caller must be both the contract owner and the development wallet. This setup is unnecessarily restrictive. If the development team's wallet is different from the contract deployer's wallet (which is good practice for security and decentralization), the development team would be completely unable to claim their tokens.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Contradictory Vesting Logic
The function has two conflicting requirements. require(block.timestamp >= vestingStart + vestingDuration, ...);, demands that the entire 1-year vesting period must be over before any tokens can be claimed. However, the logic that follows (lines 164-166) is designed to calculate and release tokens on a monthly basis. This contradiction means that the monthly release mechanism will never work as intended. Instead, all tokens will be released in a single transaction after the full year has passed, defeating the purpose of gradual vesting.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The claimVestedTokens function is critically vulnerable to re-entrancy because it transfers tokens before updating the teamTokensClaimed state, violating the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern. This allows an attacker who has compromised the owner's account to use a malicious contract to repeatedly call the function, draining funds within a single transaction before the balance is updated.
low Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing Visibility
It is recommended to add 'public,' 'private,' or 'internal' visibility during the declaration or initialization of a state variable or a mapping.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit the critical changes in the contract.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.