SPREDD Forecast Market Info
Spredd offers a skill-based forecasting experience that blends elements of trading, sports betting, and social competition—all while preserving users’ principal SPRDD tokens through an innovative bonding mechanism. Users forecast with USDC while optionally bonding SPRDD, which is always returned, creating an engaging, no-loss environment.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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for this project.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
SpreddMarket.sol
- The owner can resolve the market with a winning option and distribute fees.
- The owner can withdraw the accumulated fees.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Spredd Forecast Market smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Spredd Forecast Market team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Payout Calculation Flaw Leads to Trapped Funds and User Losses
The contract suffers from a critical accounting error where platform fees are effectively deducted twice from the prize pool. The resolveMarket function correctly transfers the calculated fee percentages out of the contract's token balance. However, the getUserWinnings function, which calculates individual payouts, does not use the remaining contract balance. Instead, it starts its calculation from the original, pre-fee total volume and incorrectly subtracts the fee percentages a second time. This flaw means every winning user receives significantly less than their rightful share, with the cumulative difference being trapped in the contract. These trapped funds can then only be withdrawn by the contract owner via the emergencyWithdraw function, creating a direct financial loss for users and a centralization risk.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Fee Distribution Flaw Leads to Silent Loss of Protocol Funds
The resolveMarket function contains a critical flaw that guarantees the loss of reward pool funds under common failure scenarios. It uses a low-level .call to send fees to the fpManager contract but completely fails to check the return value to confirm if the transfer succeeded. If the external call to fpManager reverts for any reason—such as being paused, running out of gas, or a simple contract upgrade adding a new validation rule—the SpreddMarket contract will not notice the failure and will continue its execution as if the fees were sent. This results in the rewardPoolReward tokens never leaving the contract, effectively trapping them. These funds are then lost to the reward pool and can only be recovered by the owner via the emergencyWithdraw function, creating a silent drain on protocol revenue and a significant trust issue. This vulnerability is enabled by the use of an insecure and unnecessarily complex approve/.call pattern, which should be avoided.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.