SPREDD Forecast Market Info
Spredd offers a skill-based forecasting experience that blends elements of trading, sports betting, and social competition—all while preserving users’ principal SPRDD tokens through an innovative bonding mechanism. Users forecast with USDC while optionally bonding SPRDD, which is always returned, creating an engaging, no-loss environment.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
FPManager.sol
- The authorized addresses can contribute to the reward pool.
- The owner can update the reward percentages.
- The Spredd factory contract can set the authorized contract address.
- The authorized address can award FP points to a trader for a correct prediction.
- The authorized address can award FP points to a creator for market activity.
- The owner can withdraw the funds from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Spredd Forecast Market smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Spredd Forecast Market team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerability Renders Emergency Reset Function Unusable
The forceWeeklyReset function, designed as an administrative emergency override, is critically vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack originating from its internal call to _processWeeklyReset. The core of the vulnerability lies in the on-chain finalization of the weekly leaderboard, which requires sorting an unbounded array of all weekly participants. This operation utilizes a selection sort algorithm with O(n²) computational complexity, a pattern known to be exceptionally inefficient and gas-intensive on-chain. As the number of unique participants grows with normal use of the platform, the gas required to execute this sorting logic will inevitably surpass the block gas limit. At this threshold, any transaction attempting to call forceWeeklyReset will fail, rendering the function—and thus the owner's primary recovery tool—permanently inoperable. This will result in a permanent contract freeze, preventing future weekly rollovers, the distribution of rewards, and the awarding of any new Forecast Points.
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract contains functions (setAuthorizedContract and setSpreddFactory) that grant special permissions to other addresses, allowing them to call sensitive functions like awardTraderFP and awardCreatorFP. However, these functions do not validate that the address being authorized is an actual smart contract. They are missing a check to verify if the address has associated code. This allows for an Externally Owned Account (EOA), which is a user-controlled wallet, to be set as an authorized address. If an attacker's EOA is authorized, either by a compromised factory or a mistaken owner, they could directly call the FP awarding functions. This would allow them to grant unlimited Forecast Points to themselves or any other address, fundamentally breaking the competitive integrity of the leaderboard and guaranteeing they win all the rewards.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation
The awardTraderFP function exhibits an excessive trust vulnerability by failing to validate any of the parameters it receives from authorized market contracts. It implicitly assumes that all inputs, such as the user's address, position size, market volume, and liquidity metrics, are accurate and submitted in good faith. This design flaw allows a malicious or compromised market contract to act as a dishonest oracle, providing fabricated data to manipulate the point calculation. An attacker could exploit this to grant arbitrary Forecast Points to any account, inflate multipliers to generate excessive points from a small position, and ultimately control the weekly leaderboard to unfairly claim all rewards. This completely undermines the integrity and fairness of the entire system.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.