SPREDD Forecast Market Info
Spredd offers a skill-based forecasting experience that blends elements of trading, sports betting, and social competition—all while preserving users’ principal SPRDD tokens through an innovative bonding mechanism. Users forecast with USDC while optionally bonding SPRDD, which is always returned, creating an engaging, no-loss environment.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
SpreddMarketFactory.sol
- The owner can add/remove the supported tokens.
- The owner can set the FP manager.
- The owner can withdraw the factory fees.
- The owner can withdraw ETH from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Spredd Forecast Market smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Spredd Forecast Market team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Incorrect renders on-Chain Fee Accounting Non-Functional
The factory's on-chain revenue tracking feature is fundamentally broken due to a logical disconnect between the contracts. The SpreddFactory contract is designed to increment its collectedFees counter only within the receiveFactoryFees function. However, the SpreddMarket contracts send their fees using a direct token.safeTransfer() call, which only updates the factory's token balance and does not—and cannot—trigger the receiveFactoryFees function. As a result, the code that sends the money and the code that counts the money are never connected. This means that while the factory correctly receives its fee tokens, the collectedFees state variable is never updated and will always report 0, rendering the protocol's on-chain accounting feature completely non-functional and misleading.
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Lack of Fee Validation Allows Owner to Halt Market Creation
The setMarketCreationFee function is missing essential input validation, creating a significant centralization risk. It allows the owner to set the marketCreationFee to any arbitrary value. A malicious or compromised owner could exploit this by setting an astronomically high fee that no user could possibly pay. This would cause the fee transfer within the createMarket function to revert for every user, effectively halting all new market creation on the platform. This gives the owner the unilateral power to cause a denial-of-service for the protocol's primary function, violating the principle of least privilege.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
The supportedTokens Mechanism is Logically Disconnected and Non-Functional.
The contract contains a significant logical contradiction. It includes an entire mechanism for managing a list of supportedTokens, implying the factory is designed to create markets for multiple different ERC20 tokens. However, the createMarket function completely ignores this mechanism and exclusively uses the single tradingToken that was set in the constructor for all operations, including the collection of the creation fee. The supportedTokens list is never used, and it is impossible to create a market with any other token. This indicates a deep flaw in the protocol design.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.