SparkStarter Info
SparkStarter didn’t just help us launch — they became true partners. Their strategic guidance, technical support, and hands-on approach set them apart. The Tax Vault System was a game-changer for building trust with our community. We’re excited to keep growing together.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The incubator can release the ETH and tokens from the vault.
- The owner can enable trading only once.
- The owner can whitelist wallets.
- The owner can add Liquidity in the contract.
- The owner can update the incubator in the contract.
- The authorized address can update the deployer address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the SparkStarter smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the SparkStarter team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Logical Flaws in Liquidity Provision Function
A vulnerability exists within the addLp function that grants an unnecessary and highly dangerous approval, exposing the personal wallet of the contract deployer (msg.sender) to a complete and irreversible loss of funds. The function approves the DEX router to spend the entire total supply of the token directly from the deployer's wallet. This approval is not required for the function's operation, as liquidity is provisioned using funds already held by the contract. This creates a catastrophic attack vector: should the DEX router contract ever be exploited or misconfigured, an attacker could drain the deployer's personal token holdings. Furthermore, the function contains logical flaws, including granting a redundant and nonsensical approval to the DEX router on behalf of the whitelistBuyer contract, which never holds tokens that the router would need to spend.
low Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended to remove unused code from the contract.