Space Saloon Info
One of the most legendary, addictive, and unforgettable features of all time within the crypto and NFT gaming universe is returning, evolved to an entirely new level. In BSC SpaceSaloon, every player will have the opportunity to send their own fleets on dangerous interplanetary expeditions, where risk and reward merge into an experience designed to keep players engaged from the very first moment. Each expedition represents a true strategic mission. The more powerful, rare, and advanced your fleet is, the higher the chances of success and the more valuable the rewards will be. There are no artificial limits here: you will be able to send as many fleets on expeditions daily as the number of fleets you own, opening the door to completely personalized playstyles and economic strategies. Some players will focus on building massive space mining armies, while others will choose to invest in a small number of extremely exclusive and devastating fleets.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The PINK contract implements an ERC20 token with a fixed supply, holder controlled burning, and gasless approvals through EIP-2612 permit. The whole supply of ten million tokens is created once at deployment and assigned to a single recipient, and the contract adds no custom logic on top of the well known, widely used token components it is built from. The review found no critical, high, or medium severity issues; the observations are limited to one low severity best practice item and a few informational notes.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been fully renounced by design, since the contract was deployed without any owner or administrative role in the first place. There are no owner only or role gated functions, so no address holds elevated privileges. The capabilities of the contract are therefore limited to the standard token actions that are available to every holder, and there are strong limitations on what any party can do:
- Any holder can transfer their own tokens freely, with no restrictions or gating.
- Any holder can burn their own tokens, and an approved spender can burn from a granted allowance.
- Any holder can approve spenders directly or gaslessly through a signed permit message.
- Balances and allowances are governed solely by each account and the spenders it has approved.
- No party, including the deployer, can mint new tokens; the supply is fixed at deployment.
- No party can pause, freeze, lock, or blacklist any account or transfer.
- No party can set or change fees, and transfers carry no fee.
- No party can upgrade or change the contract logic, because it is not a proxy and has no upgrade path.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- It is built entirely on audited, widely used token components with no custom modifications to the value moving logic.
- The supply is fixed with no post deployment minting, rebasing, reflection, or hidden allocation.
- Signature based approvals are protected against replay by per account nonces and are bound to this specific chain, and invalid or malleable signatures are rejected.
- The published source matches the deployed bytecode, and the token exposes none of the owner, pause, blacklist, fee, or trading toggle mechanisms that are commonly associated with honeypot behaviour.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the PINK smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the PINK team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Floating compiler pragma
The source uses a floating version pragma (caret 0.8.27), which allows the contract to be compiled with any 0.8 release at or above 0.8.27, including future ones. Building with a different compiler than intended can change the generated code or the targeted EVM feature set and hurts reproducibility. For the deployed instance the practical impact is nil because it was compiled and verified with a fixed 0.8.27, so the concern is forward looking and applies to any redeployment from this source.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Constructor could be declared payable
Marking the constructor payable removes the compiler inserted check that rejects a non zero msg.value and saves a small amount of gas, but only once, at deployment. Because a payable constructor also allows native coin to be sent and then locked in the contract at deploy time, the trade off is unfavourable for a token. The contract otherwise already relies on gas efficient custom errors and a compile time supply constant, and its own code contains no loops or redundant storage operations to optimise.
informational Issues | 5 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Entire supply allocated to a single externally owned account
The constructor mints the whole fixed supply to a single recipient address, and on chain that address is a normal externally owned account that still holds almost all of the tokens. This is a distribution and centralisation characteristic rather than a coding defect, but it means one private key effectively controls the entire supply. A compromise of that key, or a decision to sell, could move or dump the full supply, and the contract itself provides no vesting, timelock, or multisig protection against this.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
No recovery path for tokens sent to the contract
The contract has no function to recover tokens or native coin accidentally sent to its own address, so any such funds are permanently unrecoverable. At the time of review the contract holds none of its own tokens, so nothing is currently stuck. This is only a user error safety net and does not affect normal token operation, and leaving it out is consistent with keeping the contract free of any privileged role.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
ERC-20 approve race condition
The standard approve function overwrites the existing allowance rather than requiring it to be reset to zero first. A spender who watches pending transactions could, in a specific ordering, spend the old allowance and then the newly set one. This is inherent to the ERC-20 standard and is shared by essentially all compliant tokens; the risk is limited and requires an already trusted spender together with precise transaction ordering. The token mitigates this in practice by offering permit as an alternative approval mechanism.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Bytecode targets a recent EVM version and emits PUSH0
The contract was compiled for a recent EVM version, so the produced bytecode uses newer opcodes such as PUSH0. The current chain supports these and the contract is deployed and functioning, so there is no issue for this deployment. The note only matters if the same code is redeployed to an EVM chain that does not support these opcodes, where deployment or execution could fail.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
Missing NatSpec documentation
The contract and its constructor carry no NatSpec documentation such as a title, notice, parameter description, or developer notes. While this does not affect behaviour, documentation improves readability for reviewers and integrators and makes the intended fixed supply and ownerless design explicit in the source.