Smart Props Solution Info
SPS | Real Estate Tokenization Built on Base (L2 Ethereum) Stake. Invest. Grow.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The Token contract implements the Smart Props Solution (SPS) token initialization, fixed token supply distribution, dynamic transaction taxing (liquidity and marketplace taxes), and basic token burning mechanics. While the overall design correctly inherits and implements the OpenZeppelin ERC20 standard for core accounting, several critical areas require attention: the entire total supply is minted permissionlessly upfront to hardcoded externally owned accounts (EOAs) rather than governed protocol vaults; the taxation logic allows the owner to arbitrarily change tax percentages to any amount without limits; and the administrative controls can be updated in a single transaction with no timelock or DAO governance enforcement.
Ownership Privileges
The privileges within the contract are distributed across three roles: the Initial Recipients (who receive the entire supply upon deployment), the Owner (who governs the dynamic tax configuration), and End Users (who hold, transfer, and burn tokens).
Initial Recipients (Hardcoded in constructor)
- Upon deployment, the entire 600,000,000 SPS token supply is minted and distributed across five hardcoded wallet addresses representing the presale, staking, marketplace, DEX/CEX listings, and treasury reserves.
- Limitation: These accounts have no special on-chain administrative privileges after receiving the initial mint; they function purely as standard token holders.
- Critical Note: Because these receiving addresses are not strictly bound to timelock contracts or vesting schedules on-chain at the time of token deployment, the entire functional token supply is immediately liquid and reliant entirely on the off-chain trust and management of the keyholders.
Contract Owner (onlyOwner modifier)
- The owner can call
setTaxesto arbitrarily change theliquidityTaxandmarketTaxpercentages at any point. - The owner can call
updateExcludedFromTaxMappingto whitelist specific addresses from paying transfer taxes. - The owner can call
updateLiquidityWalletandupdateMarketWalletto instantly change the destination where all dynamically collected token taxes are routed during user transfers. - The owner can call
setEnableTaxto globally toggle the transaction tax system on or off. - Limitation: Cannot mint new tokens — the
_mintfunction is strictly internal and is only executed once during the constructor phase. The supply is hard-capped. - Limitation: Cannot freeze user wallets or directly pause the token contract via a global pause function (though setting taxes to 100% acts as a pseudo-pause for non-whitelisted users).
- Critical Note: All administrative actions (updating wallets, changing taxes) take effect immediately. There is no timelock, cooldown, or multisig voting enforcement natively built into the token contract itself.
End Users (Token Holders)
- Any user can transfer tokens natively, subject to the active
liquidityTaxandmarketTaxdeductions ifenableTaxingis set to true and their address is not whitelisted. - Any user can call
burnto permanently destroy their own tokens, progressively making the token deflationary and reducing the_totalSupply. - Limitation: Users have no control or voting power over the tax rates applied to their transfers.
- Limitation: The contract automatically deducts taxes during the standard
transferandtransferFromflows, meaning users will receive slightly fewer tokens than the requested transfer amount unless explicitly excluded by the owner.
Note — This audit report consists of a security analysis of the Token.sol contract. This analysis did not include functional testing, unit testing, or simulation of token transfer mechanics under live network conditions. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the protocol.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Uncapped Transaction Taxes (Centralization Risk / Honeypot)
The Token contract allows the owner to dynamically modify the liquidityTax and marketTax percentages via the updateTaxAndEnable function. However, the function lacks a hardcoded upper bound or sanity check on the input values. This unregulated privilege allows a malicious or compromised owner to set the combined tax rates to 100% (or higher), effectively creating a "honeypot" where users are permanently blocked from buying, selling, or transferring their tokens, as the entire transfer amount would be siphoned to the protocol's fee wallets or cause mathematical underflow reverts.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 optimization Issue
Unbounded Loops and Out-of-Gas Risk in Mapping Updates
Both the updateDexPairMapping and updateExcludedFromTaxMapping functions process unrestricted address arrays (address[] calldata addressList) and iterate over their entire lengths using for loops to update the isDexPair and isExcludedFromTax state mappings. Because neither function enforces a maximum size on the input array, the gas required scales linearly with the number of addresses provided. If the contract owner submits an excessively large list of addresses in a single transaction (e.g., to whitelist thousands of early presale participants), the transaction will consume gas until it inevitably breaches the network's hard block gas limit. This results in an Out-of-Gas (OOG) revert, effectively blocking the batch update and forcing administrative operations to fail until manually split into much smaller payloads.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended to remove the unused code from the contract.