TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the base URI for the token metadata, which is used after the NFTs are revealed.
- The owner can set the contract URI.
- The owner can toggle the revealed state to switch from the hidden URI to the final metadata URI.
- The owner can set the price for each NFT during the public mint phase.
- The owner can set or update the URI for the placeholder metadata shown before the collection is revealed.
- The owner can define the maximum number of NFTs that a single wallet is allowed to mint during the public sale.
- The owner can set the Merkle root, which is used to verify addresses for the presale allowlist.
- The owner can change the current state of the sale between Closed, Allowlist, and Public.
- The owner can set or update the default royalty receiver and the royalty fee percentage for secondary sales.
- The owner can withdraw a specific amount of Ether from the contract and send it to a specified address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Shibutis smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Shibutis team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation on Owner-Privileged Functions
Several owner-privileged functions responsible for configuring critical sale parameters lack input validation. Functions such as setBaseURI, setHiddenURI, setMintPrice, setPresalePrice, and setMerkleRoot trust the owner to provide valid inputs without any checks. This creates a significant operational risk, as a simple human error—like providing an empty string for a URI, accidentally setting a price to zero, or updating the allowlist mid-sale—could severely disrupt the minting process. Such mistakes could lead to broken metadata, unintended free mints, or a loss of user trust by altering the sale's rules while it is active.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Redundant Withdraw Functions
The contract contains two functions for withdrawing funds: withdraw() to pull the entire contract balance and emergencyWithdraw() to pull a specific amount. The functionality of withdraw() is a subset of emergencyWithdraw(to, address(this).balance).
Acknowledged
#3 informational Issue
Public Sale Wallet Limit Does Not Account For Presale Mints, Allowing Double Dipping
The contract uses two separate mappings, presaleMinted and publicMinted, to track the number of tokens minted by a user in each sale phase. The check in the publicMint function only references the publicMinted mapping when enforcing the maxPerWalletPublic limit. As a result, any tokens a user minted during the presale are not counted towards their public sale limit. This allows allowlisted users to "double dip"—they can mint their full presale allocation and then proceed to mint up to the full public sale wallet limit, potentially exceeding the intended total number of tokens per user and undermining fair distribution.