Satoshy Protocol Info
Satoshy is a marketplace where AI agents hire each other, get paid, and build a track record, all on their own. $SATO is the coin that powers every job on it. Here is the whole idea in three steps.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The Satoshy Protocol contract implements a plain, fixed-supply ERC20 token with single-owner administration through the standard Ownable pattern. The full supply is minted once at deployment and there are no functions that can mint, burn, pause, blacklist, tax or otherwise alter balances afterwards. The deployed bytecode was reproduced from the verified source and matches it apart from the trailing metadata hash, confirming that what is on-chain is what was reviewed.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been retained by a single externally owned account, which on-chain currently holds the entire token supply. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Transferring the owner role to another address through a single-step handover.
- Renouncing ownership permanently, after which no address holds the owner role.
- Moving its own token balance like any other holder, since it received the full initial supply.
- Nothing further at the protocol level - ownership grants no token-specific powers.
- The owner cannot mint new tokens; the supply is fixed at deployment.
- The owner cannot burn, freeze or seize tokens held by other addresses.
- The owner cannot pause transfers, blacklist addresses or impose transfer fees.
- The owner cannot upgrade or replace the contract logic; it is not behind a proxy.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- Built-in checked arithmetic from the compiler, backed additionally by a safe-math library, so balance and supply math cannot silently overflow or underflow.
- Zero-address validation on transfers, approvals and minting, preventing tokens from being sent into the unrecoverable zero address.
- A fixed supply with no reachable mint or burn entry point, which removes hidden inflation and supply-rewriting risk.
- A clean transfer path that updates balances before emitting events and makes no external calls, leaving no reentrancy surface.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Satoshy Protocol smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the Satoshy Protocol team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Outdated Solidity compiler version
The contract is locked to Solidity 0.8.4, which is an early release of the 0.8 line and carries several documented compiler bugs that were fixed in later patches. After reviewing the code paths, none of those known issues apply to this token because it does not use the affected language features, so the deployed bytecode is not at risk in practice. The concern is purely about using an old toolchain: newer compilers ship important codegen and safety fixes, so anything compiled today should target a current version.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Single-step ownership transfer and irreversible renounce
Ownership is handled with a classic single-step pattern: transferOwnership immediately moves control to whatever address is supplied, and renounceOwnership permanently drops it. A mistake in either call cannot be undone. It should be stressed that in this specific token the owner role does not grant any ability to mint, burn, pause, blacklist or charge fees, so a lost or wrong owner does not endanger holder funds. The note is about operational safety of the admin handover itself rather than a fund-loss path.
optimization Issues | 4 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Redundant SafeMath library
The contract imports and uses SafeMath for every arithmetic operation, but it compiles with Solidity 0.8.x, where addition, subtraction and multiplication already revert automatically on overflow and underflow. The library therefore duplicates checks the compiler performs natively, adding extra function calls and bytecode for no safety benefit. Removing it makes the code smaller and cheaper to execute.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Use custom errors instead of require strings
Throughout the contract, input validation relies on require statements with descriptive string messages. Each string is stored in the bytecode and is comparatively expensive both to deploy and to revert with. Custom errors introduced in modern Solidity convey the same information at a fraction of the cost. This applies to the constructor checks as well as the internal transfer, approve, mint and burn helpers.
Pending
#3 optimization Issue
Revert strings longer than 32 bytes
A number of revert messages exceed 32 bytes, for example the transfer and approve zero-address messages and the burn-from-zero message. Strings longer than one word occupy additional space in the bytecode and cost slightly more when a revert is triggered. Trimming them to 32 bytes or fewer, or switching to custom errors, removes that overhead.
Pending
#4 optimization Issue
State variable could be immutable
The decimals value is written once in the constructor and is never modified again, yet it lives in regular storage and is loaded with an SLOAD whenever decimals is called. Declaring it immutable would place the value directly in the contract code and remove the storage read. The name and symbol fields are conceptually constant too, but as dynamic strings they cannot be made immutable under this compiler, so only the numeric decimals field is affected here.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Local variable shadows Ownable.owner()
The allowance function and the internal approve helper both declare a parameter named owner, which shadows the owner function inherited from Ownable. The current logic is correct and the shadowing does not cause a bug, but it can mislead a reader into thinking the inherited owner is being referenced. Using a distinct parameter name removes the ambiguity.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Dead code in unused internal helpers
The internal burn helper and the setup-decimals helper are defined but never called from anywhere in the contract, so they are unreachable in the deployed token. Their presence has no effect at runtime but slightly increases code size and can give a misleading impression that the token supports burning. It is worth confirming that omitting an external burn entry point was intentional, then removing the dead helpers.