Sakai Vault Info
Sakai Vault is a decentralized spot and perpetual exchange that supports low swap fees and zero price impact trades. Trading is supported by a unique multi-asset pool that earns liquidity providers fees from market making, swap fees and leverage trading. Sakai Vault is a next crypto revolution and it is Accelerates DeFi Adoption With Trusted Blockchain Protocol and Unique Token Economics Sakai Vault Provides its customers and investors with insights on trends and developments in the crypto space. We provide an in-depth look at selected topics ranging from cryptocurrency fundamentals to market analyses and help to grow your investment with us.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Owner privileges
- reset eligible
- only if the current timestamp is higher than the "endingAt" variable
- stop eligible
- only if the current timestamp is higher than the "endingAt" variable
- by setting the "startingAt" variable to 0, nobody can execute the "buy" function anymore
- update the price per ticket
- this can be set to any arbitrary value
- Enable/disable auto pick winner
- update eligible day
- any arbitrary value is possible
- update committed token address
- update staking address
- update charity address
- update router address
- update busd address
- update nft address
- update percent winner
- update percent tax claim
- staking + charity <= 25%
- execute the pick winners function manually
The owner can lock user funds by setting an arbitrary address for the nft. That causes the nft contract functions are not callable anymore.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Sakai Vault smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Sakai Vault team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Weak PRNG (weak-prng)
Instead of implementing a random function in the contract which is predictable, use an external service like chainlink for randomness.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
EligibleAmounts will be overridden
Instead of setting the amounts to the eligibleAmounts, add it to it because it is possible that the eligibleAmounts at index "x" didn't claim the winner amounts. If the same user will be randomly chosen again, the eligibleAmounts will be overridden instead of added.
low Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)
Check that the address is not zero.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Everybody can call the buyback for any arbitrary addresses
There may be someone who doesn't want to call the "buyback" function. It is recommended to prevent the buyback call for tokenId's, which is not owned by the caller himself.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Public function that could be declared external (external-function)
Use the `external` attribute for functions never called from the contract.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Functions that are not used (dead-code)
Remove unused functions.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Balance check is unnecessary
It is not needed to check the balance is above/equal the amount during the burning because it is already checked in the "_burn" function.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Setting charityAddress twice
In the constructor, the "charityAddress" is set to the msg.sender first and afterwards to the "_charityAddress"