TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner or penalty recipient can start staking.
- The owner or penalty recipient can recover ERC20 tokens from the contract, excluding the staking and reward tokens.
- The owner or penalty recipient can sweep the remaining reward tokens from the contract.
- The owner can pause/unpause the staking and unstaking functionality in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Ryoshi Staking smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Ryoshi team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Reward Calculation Flaw in unstake and claimReward Functions
A vulnerability exists in the reward calculation logic within the getAccRewardPerWeightAt function, which is used by both unstake and claimReward. The function incorrectly uses the live, current totalWeightedStake of the contract to calculate rewards for past periods instead of using the historical weighted stake value that was present when those rewards were being earned. This flaw can be exploited through a front-running attack. A malicious actor can stake a very large amount of tokens just before a victim attempts to unstake or claim, dramatically increasing the totalWeightedStake and causing the victim's past rewards to be diluted and significantly reduced.
low Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Unfunded Reward Promises Create a "First-Come, First-Served" System for Payouts
A vulnerability exists because the contract does not verify that it has been funded with enough rewardToken to meet the distributionAmount promised in the constructor. The owner can set a large reward amount to attract stakers but only deposit a fraction of that amount into the contract. This creates a deceptive situation where the contract promises rewards it cannot deliver. As a result, rewards are paid out on a "first-come, first-served" basis. Once the limited, actual supply of reward tokens is exhausted, all subsequent attempts to unstake or claimReward will fail, causing later users to lose their rightfully earned rewards.