Runwago Info
Runwago is a next-generation Run-to-earn app designed for active runners who want to monetize their physical activity while staying motivated to achieve their healthy lifestyle goals. Its revenue model is 100% sustainable: rewards are funded by users who fail to meet their running goals, forfeiting their deposits into the Runwago Deposit Pool.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The server role can set the Merkle root.
- The admin can withdraw the USDTStable coin from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the ReferralUSDTRewards smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Runwago team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The contract contains the functionality in which the claim function (and similar functions like withdraw), making an external call to transfer ERC20 tokens using the transfer function. Since the contract hasn't yet marked the claim as completed (i.e., updated the claimed variable), the attacker can exploit this to re-enter the claim function, repeatedly withdrawing tokens. The transfer happens first (interaction with an external contract) before the internal state is updated. The nonReentrant modifier ensures that any attempts to call the claim function again during execution are blocked, providing an additional safeguard. Therefore, It is recommended to do the check-effect-transaction method or use the non-reentrant modifier to prevent the code from this issue.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
The admin can drain claimable tokens.
The admin's ability to withdraw tokens mid-sale via emergencyWithdraw introduces significant risks, including insufficient funds in the contract, which could prevent users from claiming tokens. This centralization issue also impacts the claim process and could lead to misuse. To mitigate these risks, safeguards should be implemented, such as limiting withdrawal amounts, checking available token balances before allowing withdrawals, and ensuring the function is used only during true emergencies. Additionally, adopting a multi-signature or governance-based solution would reduce the risks of a single admin having full control over token withdrawals, ensuring more secure and transparent management.