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Runwago Info

www.runwago.com

Runwago is a next-generation Run-to-earn app designed for active runners who want to monetize their physical activity while staying motivated to achieve their healthy lifestyle goals. Its revenue model is 100% sustainable: rewards are funded by users who fail to meet their running goals, forfeiting their deposits into the Runwago Deposit Pool.

Runwago Logo
Onboarded date 22/11/2024

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

11.28
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/09/04
Revision date 2025/09/04

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Token transfer can be locked

Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is upgradeable

The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set the TGETimestamp.
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can update the non-merkle root claim amounts.
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can update the vesting schedule for a specific round.
  • The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can withdraw the tokens from the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Vesting smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Runwago team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
1
Medium
Low
Optimization
Informational
medium Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Indefinite Claiming Lock via TGE Timestamp Control
Vesting.sol
L119-121
Description

The Vesting contract grants the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE exclusive control over setting the Token Generation Event (TGE) timestamp via the setTgeTimestamp function. This creates a critical centralization vulnerability. An administrator can indefinitely prevent the start of the token claiming period by either refusing to set the timestamp or by setting it to a distant future date. Since the claimTokens function is gated by a modifier that checks this timestamp, this gives the admin the unilateral power to permanently lock all user funds within the contract, preventing any vesting participant from ever claiming their tokens.

Comments

To address this risk, the ability to set the tgeTimestamp should be restricted so it cannot be used to block claims. The recommended approach is to make the timestamp immutable after it has been set for the first time. This can be achieved by adding a requirement within the setTgeTimestamp function, such as require(tgeTimestamp == 0, "TGE timestamp can only be set once");.

Resolved

#2 medium Issue
Admin Can Arbitrarily Modify User Vesting Allocations
Vesting.sol
L185-193
Description

The updateNonMerkleRootClaimAmount function grants the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE the unilateral power to set and, more critically, overwrite the token allocations for any user in the non-Merkle-based vesting rounds. The function uses a direct assignment to update a user's claimable amount, which means an administrator can change a user's allocation at any time, even after vesting has begun. This introduces a severe trust issue, as a malicious or compromised admin could reduce a user's allocation to zero just before they claim, effectively stealing their vested tokens. This mutability undermines the core premise of a secure and predictable vesting contract.

Comments

To prevent this vulnerability, the function should be modified to make allocations immutable once set. A require statement should be added to check if a user already has an allocation for a specific round before the assignment is made. For instance, adding a check like require(nonMerkleRootToClaimAmount[users[i]][roundName] == 0, "Allocation can only be set once"); would prevent any modification after the initial allocation is recorded. This transforms the function from a risky "update" operation to a much safer "set-once" operation, guaranteeing to users that their vested amounts cannot be altered or removed by the administrator.

Acknowledged

#3 medium Issue
Unrestricted Admin Withdrawal of Vested Tokens
Vesting.sol
L218-222
Description

The Vesting contract contains an emergencyWithdraw function that is exclusively accessible to the address holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This function allows the administrator to unilaterally withdraw any amount of the runwagoToken held by the contract. A malicious or compromised administrator could exploit this by calling the function with the contract's entire token balance, effectively draining all funds, including those that are locked and allocated to users under various vesting schedules. This action would cause all subsequent user claim transactions to fail, resulting in a permanent and total loss of vested tokens for all participants.

Comments

To fully mitigate this critical risk, the emergencyWithdraw function should be removed from the contract. A vesting contract's core promise is the secure, time-locked release of funds, and a function that allows a single entity to bypass this defeats its purpose. If an emergency fund-recovery mechanism is considered essential, it must be decentralized.

low Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
Vesting.sol
L119-121
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.