Royal Infinity Info
Royal Infinity is a crowd-funded ROI ecosystem built on the Binance blockchain. It features a secure, ownerless smart contract with No admin control, ensuring full transparency and decentralization. A revolutionary global project offering a safe and secure investment approach.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can update the time interval.
- The owner can add the allowed tokens.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the RoyalInfinity smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the RoyalInfinity team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
The contract can lock ETH/BNB
The presence of the receive() and fallback() functions means the contract can be sent native currency like ETH or BNB, but there is no function to withdraw it. Any native currency sent to the contract address would be permanently locked.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing Upper Limit on timeInterval Allows for Halting of All Rewards
The updateTimeInterval function presents a significant centralization risk due to a missing upper limit on the interval value. An owner can exploit this by setting the timeInterval to an arbitrarily large number, which would effectively halt all time-based calculations for rewards. As a result, both daily ROI claims and booster pool payouts would perpetually calculate to zero, freezing all reward distributions across the platform and allowing the owner to trap user funds.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Unsafe ERC20 Method Calls Pose Security Risks
The smart contract currently faces a significant security risk due to its direct use of the standard ERC20 functions: .approve(), .transfer(), and .transferFrom(). These functions have well-documented vulnerabilities that can be exploited. For instance, the .approve() function is susceptible to a race condition that a malicious actor could leverage to manipulate token allowances. Furthermore, the contract manually checks the return values of token transfers, which is not fully reliable as some non-standard ERC20 tokens may return false on failure instead of reverting, potentially leading to unexpected contract states. The linter also correctly identifies a potential reentrancy vulnerability in the claimToken function, where a malicious token contract could re-enter the function after a transfer but before internal accounting is complete, enabling a possible drain of funds.