RigWorkZ Info
RigWorkZ is a next-generation, fully decentralised marketplace designed to connect mining plant operators and hardware owners with a global pool of investors. The platform transforms mining investment from an opaque and high-risk venture into a transparent, data-driven, and accessible experience for everyone.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The timelock can update the tax beneficiaries addresses along with their percentages.
- The timelock can update the buy and sell taxes to not more than 5%.
- The timelock can update the swap threshold value between 0.01% to 0.2% of the total supply.
- The timelock address can update the trading pair address.
- The timelock address can exclude wallets from limits.
- The timelock address can disable limits.
- The timelock address can set the max transaction value.
- The timelock address can set the max wallet limit.
- The timelock address can disable swapping.
- The timelock address can update the WETH address for the swap path.
- The timelock address can rescue the stuck tokens.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the RigWorkZ smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the RigWorkZ team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
Missing check for parameters.
Several administrative functions within the RigWorkZ smart contract lack essential input validation for their parameters. Specifically, the setMaxTx, setMaxWallet, setPair, setExcluded, and rescueERC20 functions do not sufficiently validate the values provided by the timelock-controlled administrator. This oversight could lead to severe operational issues. For instance, setting the maximum transaction amount to zero via setMaxTx(0) would effectively halt all token transfers for non-excluded wallets. Furthermore, the contract allows for illogical states, such as setting a maximum transaction amount that is higher than the maximum wallet limit. The ability to set critical addresses to the zero address in other functions could also lead to permanently locked funds or unexpected behavior.
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Unnecessary Mutability of WETH Path Creates Risk
The contract includes an updateWETHPath function, which allows the timelock-controlled address to change the WETH address used for swaps. The address for Wrapped Ether (WETH) is a fixed, network-level constant for any given blockchain; it is not something that ever changes. By allowing this address to be mutable, the contract introduces a significant and unnecessary attack vector. A malicious or compromised administrator could exploit this function to change the WETH address to a malicious contract. This malicious contract could be designed to cause all swaps to fail, to drain tokens from the contract under the guise of a swap, or to perform other exploits, thereby jeopardizing the entire ecosystem and potentially creating a honeypot.
low Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Missing 'require' check(Potential honeypot)
The updateTaxBeneficiaries function allows an administrator to set any arbitrary address as a recipient for tax distributions. The function lacks a critical validation to prevent setting these beneficiary addresses to a smart contract. If a beneficiary wallet is set to a contract that is not designed to receive ETH (i.e., lacks a payable receive() or fallback() function), any attempt to distribute taxes to it will fail. Because the tax distribution is an integral part of the token selling process, this failure would cause all sell transactions that trigger an automated swap to revert. This would effectively trap user funds within the liquidity pool, creating a honeypot scenario where users can buy but cannot sell their tokens.