REKT Info
There once was a trader who lost everything. Not just once — every time. While others flexed profits, he became a meme. But instead of rage-quitting, he built something greater: $REKT — the first meme token that rewards your losses. Built on Solana. Powered by pain. Fueled by memes. This is for everyone who’s ever said, “I’m down bad,” and meant it.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
start_tge.rs
- The admin can end the presale and start the token generation event.
buy.rs
- The admin can call the buy function in presale.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the REKT-DEFI contracts. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the token’s logic. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the token.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Centralized Control Over Presale Token Allocation
The buy function is an admin-only instruction that allows the designated authority to credit any user with an arbitrary amount of presale tokens. The core issue is that this process lacks any on-chain payment verification, forcing all participants to trust the admin to act honestly and competently. While this design may be intentional to support off-chain processes like KYC or private funding rounds, it introduces a significant centralization risk. A malicious or compromised admin could unfairly distribute tokens, and if the admin key is lost, no further allocations can be made. This model shifts the security from trustless code to trusting a single entity, which can undermine investor confidence.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Precision Loss in Vesting Calculation
The formula used to calculate a user's unlocked tokens on lines 18-23 performs integer division at multiple intermediate steps (e.g., bought_token * 30 / 100). Because standard integer arithmetic truncates all decimal values, any fractional part of a token that a user is rightfully owed is rounded down and permanently lost during the calculation. This results in users consistently receiving less than their entitled amount, with the residual "dust" tokens becoming impossible to claim and effectively locked within the contract forever.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Compounding Rounding Errors Cause Permanent Loss of User Funds
The rage_claim function calculates the user's final token withdrawal through several sequential steps, each involving percentage-based calculations. The current implementation uses standard integer math (u64) which truncates, rather than rounds, any decimal remainders. This flaw causes small, but compounding, amounts of tokens to be lost at each stage of the calculation, resulting in a direct financial loss for the user, as the lost fractional tokens become permanently locked in the contract. For example, consider a user who bought 999 tokens and decides to rage claim immediately with a 20% penalty. The code first calculates the 30% TGE unlock as 999 * 30 / 100, which equals 299, when the correct amount is 299.7, meaning 0.7 tokens are immediately lost. The code then calculates the penalty on an incorrect locked amount of 700 tokens (999 - 299), resulting in further inaccuracies. In this specific scenario, the compounding rounding errors across the different stages of the calculation would cause the user to permanently lose a total of 1.26 tokens that they were rightfully owed.
low Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Use of .unwrap() on Arithmetic Operations
The code uses .unwrap() immediately following a checked arithmetic operation. While checked arithmetic prevents silent overflows and underflows, the use of .unwrap() creates a fragile failure model. If any of these operations were to fail (e.g., from an unexpected underflow in the pool's balance), the program would panic. A panic halts the entire transaction and, in a scenario where a user's or the pool's state becomes invalid due to a bug, could permanently block a user from being able to call this function, creating a Denial of Service.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Inefficient Resource Management Leads to Permanent Loss of User Rent Deposits
The rage_claim instruction correctly settles a user's token balance, but it fails to close the now-obsolete VestingUserState account. This account was funded with a SOL deposit (rent) by the user to pay for its on-chain storage. By not closing the account, the program prevents this SOL rent from being refunded. This results in a direct, though small, and permanent financial loss for every user who uses the rage claim feature. While this does not impact their primary token balance, it represents an unnecessary loss of funds and inefficient use of blockchain state.
informational Issues | 5 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Non-Idiomatic Use of Integer Type (u8) for Boolean State Variables
The smart contract defines boolean-like state variables, specifically is_initialized and is_ended within the PresaleState struct, using the u8 integer type instead of the native bool type. This approach is not idiomatic in Rust and slightly undermines the language's strong type-safety features. A u8 can represent 256 different values, whereas the program logic only intends for two states (true/false, represented by 1/0). This can decrease code clarity and introduces a theoretical risk of the state holding an invalid value, even if not possible under the current implementation.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Missing zero check for acc_reward_per_share
The start_tge function is responsible for initializing the main staking pool after the presale concludes. It calculates the initial acc_reward_per_share by dividing the reward_token_per_second by the total number of tokens bought during the presale (pool.amount). The code does not account for the scenario where the presale ends with zero participants, making pool.amount equal to zero. When this happens, the checked_div operation is followed by an .unwrap(), which triggers a panic on the division-by-zero error.
Resolved
#3 informational Issue
Unnecessary Mutable Account Reference
The state account is defined as mut (mutable), but its data is never actually changed within the handle function. It is only read from to verify the owner of the reward_vault.
Resolved
#4 informational Issue
Lack of Event Emission for Off-Chain Tracking
The function successfully receives funds but does not emit an event to the blockchain logs. This makes it harder for off-chain services, UIs, or analytics platforms to track when and by whom the reward pool is funded.
Resolved
#5 informational Issue
Presence of Unused Imports
The file fund_reward_token.rs includes several imports that are never used within the scope of the program. Specifically, events::*, Mint, Token2022, and AssociatedToken are brought into scope but are not referenced in the handle function or the FundRewardToken accounts struct. While unused imports do not create a security risk or affect the compiled program's logic, they do add unnecessary clutter to the code.