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REKT Info

rektdrop.wtf

There once was a trader who lost everything. Not just once — every time. While others flexed profits, he became a meme. But instead of rage-quitting, he built something greater: $REKT — the first meme token that rewards your losses. Built on Solana. Powered by pain. Fueled by memes. This is for everyone who’s ever said, “I’m down bad,” and meant it.

REKT Logo
Onboarded date 30/09/2025

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

80.00
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Rust
Onboard date 2025/09/30
Revision date 2025/09/30

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The admin can add new tokens to the whitelist.
  • The admin can fund the program vault in the contract. 

Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the loss-claim contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the token’s logic. Furthermore, we only audited the mentioned contract associated with this project. Other contracts related to this project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors conduct their own research before engaging with the token.

Files and details

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
Medium
Low
Optimization
Informational
medium Issues | 4 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Uninitialized State Fields
lib.rs
L22-48
Description

The initialize function of the smart contract fails to set values for the treasury, reward_vault, and last_claim_time fields within the main StateAccount. Because the StateAccount struct derives the Default trait, any fields that are not explicitly assigned a value during initialization receive a default one. Consequently, the treasury and reward_vault public keys are incorrectly set to the System Program's address (11111111111111111111111111111111), and last_claim_time is set to 0. This creates a latent bug where the program's core state is stored with incorrect data from the moment of deployment, which would cause any future logic relying on these fields to fail or behave in unintended ways.

Comments

To mitigate this issue, the initialize function must be modified to ensure the StateAccount is fully and correctly populated. The function signature should be updated to accept parameters for the treasury and reward_vault public keys. Inside the function, these parameters must then be used to explicitly assign the correct addresses to state.treasury and state.reward_vault. Additionally, for the sake of clarity and completeness, state.last_claim_time should be explicitly initialized to 0. This ensures that the state account is valid and complete upon creation, preventing future errors and aligning the contract's on-chain data with its intended design.

Resolved

#2 medium Issue
Global Cooldown Leads to Denial of Service
lib.rs
L50-127
Description

The contract's cooldown mechanism is implemented using a single, global last_claim_time variable that applies to all users. When any user executes a successful claim_loss transaction, this global timestamp is updated, initiating the cooldown period for the entire program. This design creates a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. A malicious actor, or even a normal user, with the ability to make a valid claim can strategically time their transaction to occur just as the cooldown period expires. By doing so, they can perpetually reset the global timer, effectively preventing all other legitimate users from being able to successfully execute their own claims and interact with the contract's primary function.

Comments

To resolve this, the cooldown must be enforced on a per-user basis. This requires modifying the UserState struct to include a last_claim_time field. The claim_loss function must then be updated to read this timestamp from the caller's specific user_state account to check their cooldown, and upon a successful claim, it must write the new timestamp back to that same user-specific account.

Resolved

#3 medium Issue
Per-Wallet Claim Limit Is Not Enforced On-Chain
lib.rs
L50-127
Description

The contract fails to track the cumulative amount a user has claimed, instead only checking if a single claim's amount is below the bonus_cap_per_wallet. This delegates the responsibility of enforcing total withdrawal limits to the off-chain backend, creating a critical single point of failure. For example, if the backend_admin_key is ever compromised, an attacker can use it to sign an unlimited number of valid claim messages for the same wallet. They could sign a message for 100 tokens, which the contract would approve. Since the contract doesn't record that this user has claimed anything, the attacker can immediately sign another message for 100 tokens, and the contract will approve it again.

Comments

The contract must be the ultimate enforcer of its own accounting. To fix this, a total_claimed_amount field should be added to the UserState struct to track each user's cumulative claims. The claim_loss function must be refactored to read this value and perform a critical check: require!(user_state.total_claimed_amount + current_claim_amount <= bonus_cap_per_wallet, ...). After the token transfer is successfully executed, the function must then update the user_state by adding the current_claim_amount to the user's total_claimed_amount.

Resolved

#4 medium Issue
Incorrect Authorization Restricts Deposits to Admin Only
lib.rs
L143-153
Description

The fund_token function is critically flawed due to an incorrect authorization model that prevents it from serving its intended purpose as a public deposit mechanism. The function's account validation struct (FundToVesting) uses a has_one = authority constraint, which strictly requires the transaction signer to be the program's administrative authority. This means that only the program's admin can call the function, completely blocking regular users from depositing funds. This design is fundamentally incorrect for a public funding endpoint, as it prevents the community or stakeholders from supplying the contract's token vault. The issue is compounded by misleading naming (FundToVesting), suggesting a design that is misaligned with the function's simple token transfer logic.

Comments

To correct this high-severity issue, the has_one = authority constraint must be removed from the state account validation within the FundToVesting struct. By removing this check, the function will correctly interpret the authority signer as the owner of the user_vault from which tokens are being sent, allowing any user to deposit funds. Additionally, for code clarity and maintainability, the FundToVesting context struct should be renamed to FundToken to accurately reflect its use, and the _ctx variable should be renamed to ctx to follow standard Rust conventions.

low Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Magic Number Used for Whitelist Capacity Check
lib.rs
L129-141
Description

The function checks if the whitelist is full by comparing the number of tokens against the hardcoded value 20. This is considered a "magic number" because the value's meaning is not self-evident, and it creates a maintenance risk. A constant, MAX_WHITELIST_TOKEN_COUNT, is already defined at the top of the program for this exact purpose and is used correctly in the initialize function, but it is not used here.

Comments

To improve code quality, maintainability, and consistency, the hardcoded value 20 should be replaced with the MAX_WHITELIST_TOKEN_COUNT constant. The validation line should be changed to require!(state.whitelist_tokens.len() < MAX_WHITELIST_TOKEN_COUNT, CustomError::WhitelistOverflow);.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Potential Panic on Integer Overflow During Signature Verification
ed25519.rs
L21-74
Description

In the check_ed25519_data function, the length of the message payload (msg.len()) is converted from a usize to a u16 using the .unwrap() method. This method will cause the entire program to panic if the message length ever exceeds the u16 limit of 65,535 bytes. While this scenario is not practically possible in the contract's current implementation due to the small size of the signed message, the use of .unwrap() is a brittle design pattern. It creates a latent bug and forgoes robust error handling, which could become a functional issue if this utility code were ever reused in a different context with a larger message payload.

Comments

To enhance code robustness and follow safe Rust development practices, the .unwrap() call should be replaced with explicit error handling. The line should be modified to gracefully handle the potential conversion failure by mapping the error to a custom program error, for instance, CustomError::SigVerificationFailed.