QTM Finance Info
Quantum Finance is a next-generation DeFi protocol on Sonic Chain that reinvents yield farming with advanced AI and dynamic tokenomics. We overcome traditional tomb fork challenges through AI-powered trading, deflationary mechanisms, and robust governance—delivering diversified rewards in Sonic tokens, stablecoins, and more. With a sharp focus on revenue generation and backed by experts in market trading and algorithm development, Quantum Finance is built for long-term stability and sustainable growth in today’s evolving DeFi landscape.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner can set high fees
Contract owner is able to set fees above 25%. Very high fees can also prevent token transfer.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
GenesisRewardPool.sol
- The operator can add a new pool.
- The operator can update the allocation and deposit fee using the given pool ID.
- The operator can update the dev fund address.
- The operator can update the operator's address.
- The operator can recover unsupported tokens.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the QTM Finance smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the QTM Finance team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing check for _depFee
The issue arises because the add function does not enforce a cap on the deposit fee (_depFee), unlike the set function, which limits it to less than 200 (representing 2%). This means that when adding a new pool, an operator could mistakenly or maliciously set a fee high enough to exceed 100%, causing the fee to be more than the deposited amount and potentially harming users. To mitigate this risk, a validation check should be added in the add function (e.g., require(_depFee < 200)) to ensure that the fee remains within the safe limit, maintaining consistency and protecting user funds.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Lack of Validation for Token Contract Address
The contract’s add function accepts an ERC20 token address without verifying that it is actually a contract. This omission means that an operator could potentially supply an externally owned account (EOA) or an invalid address instead of a legitimate token contract. Without such a check, subsequent operations (like transfers or balance queries) may fail or behave unpredictably, potentially leading to loss of funds or other unintended consequences. To mitigate this, introduce a validation step in the add function to ensure that the supplied token address is a contract. This can be done using Solidity’s address.code.length (available in Solidity 0.8.x) to verify that the token address contains the contract code.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
No Check for Pool Tokens After 30 Days
Before 30 days after poolEndTime, the function prevents recovery of any pool tokens by iterating over all pools and requiring that the token to be recovered is not a pool token. However, after the 30-day period, the check is removed. This means that if any pool tokens (i.e. tokens deposited by users) remain in the contract after 30 days, the operator could recover them—potentially compromising user funds if users have not withdrawn yet. Notice that after 30 days there is no check to ensure that _token is not a pool token. To mitigate this, Modify the post-30-day branch to add an extra safeguard: iterate through the pools and, if the token in question is used as a pool token, require that the pool’s current deposit is zero before allowing recovery.
low Issues | 6 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Overriding of _lastRewardTime Limits Scheduling Flexibility
In the add function, the provided _lastRewardTime parameter is forcibly overridden based on the current block timestamp and the global poolStartTime. If the current time is before the global start, _lastRewardTime is set to poolStartTime, and if after, it is reset to block.timestamp when the provided value is in the past. This behavior prevents the operator from scheduling a delayed start for the pool’s reward distribution, forcing rewards to begin immediately rather than at a custom future time. To mitigate this, Adjust the logic in the add function to allow for a valid future _lastRewardTime even after poolStartTime has passed. This could be done by adding a conditional check that accepts a future _lastRewardTime value provided by the operator, ensuring it is greater than the current block time, while still maintaining overall reward distribution integrity.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Missing emit
It is recommended to emit all the critical functionalities in the contract.
Pending
#4 low Issue
Missing Valid PID Check in the set Function
The set function does not include an explicit check to verify that the provided pool ID (_pid) is within the valid range of the poolInfo array. Without this validation, an invalid _pid could lead to an out-of-bounds array access, causing the transaction to revert with a generic error. This complicates debugging and could lead to unintended behavior in the contract. To mitigate this, Add a require statement at the beginning of the function to ensure that _pid is less than poolInfo.length.
Pending
#5 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Pending
#6 low Issue
Missing Explicit Validation for _pid
The function uses the provided _pid to access the poolInfo array without first verifying that _pid is within the valid range. Although Solidity will revert on an out-of-bound access, it will do so with a generic error, which makes debugging and error messaging less clear. There is no preceding require(_pid < poolInfo.length, "Invalid pool id") or similar check.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Sensitivity to Large Time Gaps
The reward generated is based on the difference between block.timestamp and pool.lastRewardTime. If there is an unusually large time gap (whether due to network delays, miner manipulation within acceptable bounds, or a period of inactivity), the calculated reward could be unexpectedly high. This is inherent to time-based reward systems. This calculation will yield a higher reward for larger time differences, which, while expected, needs to be considered in system design to ensure it aligns with the intended economics.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Rounding Errors in Reward Calculation
The function calculates pending rewards using fixed-point arithmetic. While this is a standard method, it introduces rounding errors which may accumulate over time. Although not a bug per se, it can lead to minor discrepancies in reward distribution. This calculation uses multiplication by 1e18 to maintain precision but then performs integer division, resulting in inevitable rounding down of fractions.