QTM Finance Info
Quantum Finance is a next-generation DeFi protocol on Sonic Chain that reinvents yield farming with advanced AI and dynamic tokenomics. We overcome traditional tomb fork challenges through AI-powered trading, deflationary mechanisms, and robust governance—delivering diversified rewards in Sonic tokens, stablecoins, and more. With a sharp focus on revenue generation and backed by experts in market trading and algorithm development, Quantum Finance is built for long-term stability and sustainable growth in today’s evolving DeFi landscape.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
ShareRewardPool.sol
- The operator can add a new pool.
- The operator can update the allocation and deposit fee using the given pool ID.
- The operator can claim all farm rewards.
- The operator can convert the shadow tokens manually.
- The operator can add a gauge to the pool.
- The operator can update the operator's address.
- The operator can update the bribesafe.
- The operator can update the claim fees to not more than 15%.
- The operator can toggle must convertXShadow settings.
- The operator can update the xquant oracle address.
- The operator can toggle claim fees.
- The operator can update the minimum claim threshold value.
- The operator can toggle the claim gauge reward on the update pool setting.
- The operator can withdraw unsupported tokens.
- The operator can claim fees.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the QTM Finance smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the QTM Finance team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Lack of Validation for Token Contract Address
The contract’s add function accepts an ERC20 token address without verifying that it is actually a contract. This omission means that an operator could potentially supply an externally owned account (EOA) or an invalid address instead of a legitimate token contract. Without such a check, subsequent operations (like transfers or balance queries) may fail or behave unpredictably, potentially leading to loss of funds or other unintended consequences. To mitigate this, introduce a validation step in the add function to ensure that the supplied token address is a contract. This can be done using Solidity’s address.code.length (available in Solidity 0.8.x) to verify that the token address contains the contract code.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Approval to the Wrong Contract Address in Conversion Functions.
Both the internal conversion function (_convertXShadow) and its manual variant (convertXShadowManual) approve the XSHADOW token for spending by the X33_TOKEN contract instead of the X33_WRAPPER contract. In an ERC4626 context, the wrapper contract is the one that actually performs the deposit (conversion) operation. By approving the wrong contract, the subsequent call to the deposit function may fail because the wrapper will not have permission to pull the tokens. In both functions you see this pattern, IERC20(XSHADOW_TOKEN).approve(address(X33_TOKEN), _amount), uint256 x33ReceivedAmount = IERC4626(X33_WRAPPER).deposit(_amount, address(this));. Since X33_TOKEN and X33_WRAPPER are distinct addresses (as defined by their constants), the deposit call may not have the necessary allowance. The approval should target X33_WRAPPER.
low Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be zero or dead address.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Missing emit
Emit all the critical parameter changes.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.