PYROWORLDnet Info
Welcome to Pyro Token Universe, a groundbreaking blockchain project inspired by the legendary hero Johnny Storm, the Human Torch.PyroToken(PYC) combines innovation, scarcity, and rewards to create a dynamic ecosystem that empowers holders and fuels long-term growth.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can add the manual contributions.
- The owner can update the presale wallet address.
- The owner can update the pyro token address.
- The owner can update the round price.
- The owner can toggle the claim setting.
- The owner can withdraw ETH and tokens from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Pyroworld smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Pyroworld team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
high Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 high Issue
The owner can lock claim
The endPresaleAndClaimable function allows the owner to arbitrarily set the endPresale flag, which governs whether users can claim their tokens. If the owner sets this flag to false, users are permanently blocked from claiming their rightful tokens, even after the presale concludes. This introduces significant centralization risks, as the owner holds complete control over token claims, potentially harming users through malicious intent or negligence. Such unrestricted authority undermines trust and deters participation in the presale. To mitigate this, the flag’s update process should be automated, governed by predefined conditions, or safeguarded with multi-signature approvals or timelocks.
medium Issues | 5 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
The function assumes that the user has already set the appropriate allowance for the contract to spend their stablecoins (USDT or USDC). If the allowance is not set or is insufficient, the safeTransferFrom call will revert, causing the transaction to fail unexpectedly for the user. To mitigate this issue, add a condition to verify the user’s allowance for the contract before attempting the transfer.
Acknowledged
#2 medium Issue
Centralization risk in manual contributions.
The owner has the power to add manual contributions arbitrarily, which can potentially manipulate the soldTokens count. This might lead to misleading statistics for participants. Since no actual USD is transferred, this function relies entirely on the owner’s input for usdAmount. Incorrect or malicious input could distort the round data. If the manually added tokens exceed or approach the total allocation, it could limit availability for future contributors in the round.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
The owner can update the presale wallet address mid-sale.
The addPresaleWallet function allows the owner to update the presaleWallet address mid-sale, introducing risks of token loss, failed claims, and malicious activity. If the new wallet lacks sufficient tokens, users will be unable to claim their allocations, leading to transaction failures and trust issues. Malicious updates could reroute tokens to unauthorized addresses, permanently depriving users of their purchases. Frequent changes can also disrupt claims and raise red flags for auditors. To mitigate risks, restrict updates post-sale start, implement multi-signature approvals, ensure wallet transparency with events, and verify the new wallet’s token balance before updating. These measures protect user funds.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check.
The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.
Resolved
#5 medium Issue
The owner can change contract addresses mid-sale
Allowing the owner to change token contract addresses mid-sale via updateTokenAddress introduces risks such as user funds being lost or redirected if an invalid or malicious address is set. This could lead to failed transactions, disrupted token claims, and eroded trust among participants. Additionally, changes to pyroToken could prevent users from claiming their allocated tokens if the new contract lacks the required balance or functionality. To mitigate these risks, updates should be restricted post-sale start, require a timelock and multi-signature approval, and validate the new token’s integrity. Transparency through detailed events is essential to maintain participant confidence.
low Issues | 5 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Missing Visibility
It is recommended to add 'public,' 'private,' or 'internal' visibility during the declaration or initialization of a state variable or a mapping in the contract.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Lack of Validation for amount
The function does not validate whether the input amount is greater than 0. A user could call the function with amount = 0, resulting in unnecessary computations and gas wastage. Add a require check that the amount should not be zero.
Resolved
#4 low Issue
Missing Maximum Purchase Cap
There is no restriction on how much a single user can purchase in one transaction. A single user could purchase a disproportionate amount of tokens, denying other participants a fair opportunity. The function does not limit amount, allowing users to potentially purchase all remaining tokens in the round. To mitigate this, add a max purchase per user check so that the user cannot buy any disproportionate value.
Resolved
#5 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address is not zero or dead.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Remove unused code.
Acknowledged
#2 informational Issue
Missing emit
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.