PlotDex Info
Invest in tokenized fractional real estate from $25. Power the world's first pricing standard for property. Build on the blockchain designed for real estate.
Team and KYC Verification
The KYC verification for this project is currently in progress.
The team has submitted their information and verification is pending.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The PlotDex (PLOD) contract implements an ERC20 token with a fixed supply of one billion units, holder-burnable balances, renounceable ownership, and no post-deployment minting. The overall design is deliberately minimal and follows the well-trodden OpenZeppelin pattern for non-inflationary tokens on Binance Smart Chain. There are no fee-on-transfer mechanics, no blacklist, no pause, and no rebase. The few areas worth attention are minor:
- The contract uses single-step ownership transfer, which means a mistyped recipient in transferOwnership cannot be undone except by the unintended new owner cooperating. Switching to OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step removes this risk by requiring the receiver to call acceptOwnership before the transfer becomes effective.
- The Solidity pragma is floating at ^0.8.24 while the other two contracts in the project are at ^0.8.34. A floating pragma allows a future rebuild to pick up a newer compiler than the one audited, which can introduce subtle code-generation differences. Pinning to an exact version and aligning all three contracts to the same number removes that source of drift.
- The total supply is computed using the older 10 ** 18 form rather than the scientific notation used everywhere else in the project. Cosmetic only, but worth aligning for consistency.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been retained by the deployer and is renounceable per the project's design. The owner retains the full but deliberately narrow set of privileges:
- Transfer ownership to another address (single step, no acceptance required).
- Renounce ownership permanently, which the whitepaper indicates is the intended end state once the token is in distribution.
- No ability to mint new tokens. Total supply is locked at one billion forever.
- No ability to pause transfers, freeze accounts, blacklist holders, or take fees on transfers.
- The contract has no upgrade path, no proxy, and no admin module beyond ownership.
- Burn is a holder-side function only - no admin burn exists, so the owner cannot reduce other holders' balances.
- The contract holds no value of its own and exposes no rescue function.
- There are no fee sinks, treasury hooks, or routing of transfer value to external addresses.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- Fixed and immutable supply minted entirely at construction time, removing any possibility of post-deployment inflation.
- Direct inheritance from the OpenZeppelin v5 ERC-20 reference implementation, which means standard transfer, approval, and event-emission semantics are all delegated to a widely-audited base.
- Holder burn through ERC20Burnable provides a clean and supply-reducing exit path without administrative interaction.
- Static analysis with multiple independent tools (deterministic scanners, symbolic execution, and coverage-guided fuzzing) found no exploitable issues in the token itself; the only flagged item was the expected ownership and pragma observations noted above.
Note - This audit report consists of a security analysis of the PLOD smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the PLOD team. Other contracts associated with the project were audited in parallel but reported separately, and the broader PlotDex ecosystem (presale frontend, off-chain treasury operations, future PlotDex Chain components) was not part of this engagement. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Single-step ownership transfer can lock out the project on a typo
The PLOD token inherits the single-step Ownable implementation from OpenZeppelin v5. The owner can call transferOwnership at any time and ownership moves instantly. If the address is mistyped, the contract is handed over to the wrong recipient in one transaction, and the project cannot recover access. Even though renounceOwnership is intentionally available on PLOD per the project's design, the gap between transferring to a wrong address and renouncing remains a risk worth eliminating.
optimization Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Use scientific notation for the total-supply constant
TOTAL_SUPPLY is declared as 1_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18. The same value is more idiomatically written as 1_000_000_000e18 and that style is used everywhere else in the codebase. The change is purely cosmetic but improves readability and keeps the style consistent across the three contracts.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Constructor can be marked payable to save deployment gas
Solidity adds an implicit msg.value == 0 check to every non-payable constructor. Marking the constructor payable removes this check and saves about 200 gas of bytecode at deployment. The token has no other interaction with native BNB, so the practical impact is purely a one-time deployment-cost saving.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Solidity pragma is floating and differs from the rest of the project
PLOD declares pragma solidity ^0.8.24 while the other two contracts in scope declare ^0.8.34. The caret allows any 0.8.x version greater than or equal to the floor to compile, which means a later build could silently pick up a newer compiler than the one the audit was performed against. Pinning the pragma to an exact version and aligning all three contracts to the same number removes that uncertainty.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Approval race-condition note carried over from older ERC-20 patterns
The PLOD token inherits the standard OpenZeppelin ERC-20 approve function, which is known to be susceptible to the classic front-running race condition when a non-zero allowance is changed to another non-zero value. OpenZeppelin v5 considers this an integrator concern rather than a contract bug and exposes safeIncreaseAllowance, safeDecreaseAllowance and forceApprove in the utility layer. The behaviour is therefore expected and well documented elsewhere, but the project should mention it in its integration notes so dApps interacting with PLOD use the safe helpers.