Pierogies Info
Welcome to Pierogies.io, where delectable delights meet digital innovation. Our meme coin not only tantalizes your taste buds but also enriches your crypto portfolio. Dive into a world where every transaction is a feast, and join a community that's as flavorful as our name suggests.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.
TrustNet DataPulse
0x6588367a1d8890AAFEcAF1e3C4a1c5bBe3C4f2d0
Data provided by We are presently engaged in detailed discussions with our partners to finalize the arrangements. Information regarding presales will be made available on this platform in the near future. We appreciate your patience and look forward to sharing the upcoming opportunities with you soon!
We are currently in discussions with our partners to finalize the details. Information on token locking and vesting schedules will be provided on this platform soon. We appreciate your patience and look forward to sharing these upcoming opportunities with you shortly.
In the meantime, we’ve already integrated the LP lock overview from UNCX.network. Please visit the CEX/DEX tab for more information.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
Contract can be manipulated by owner functions.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
Staking.sol
- There are no ownership privileges in this contract.
Timelock.sol
- The creators can release the tokens after 10 years.
Timelock_contract_10yrs.sol
- The creators can release the tokens after 10 years.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Pierogies smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Pierogies team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 7 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The contract contains the functionality in which the claim function (and similar functions like withdraw), making an external call to transfer ERC20 tokens using the transfer function. Since the contract hasn't yet marked the claim as completed (i.e., updated the claimed variable), the attacker can exploit this to re-enter the claim function, repeatedly withdrawing tokens. The transfer happens first (interaction with an external contract) before the internal state is updated. The nonReentrant modifier ensures that any attempts to call the claim function again during execution are blocked, providing an additional safeguard. Therefore, It is recommended to do the check-effect-transaction method or use the non-reentrant modifier to prevent the code from this issue.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
Before calling transferFrom, the function should verify that the user has granted the required allowance to the staking contract. This provides a clearer failure point and ensures the user understands why the transaction might fail. users will immediately know that they need to approve the tokens before calling stake. It avoids calling transferFrom unnecessarily, saving gas if the allowance is insufficient.
Resolved
#3 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
Before calling transferFrom, the function should verify that the user has granted the required allowance to the staking contract. This provides a clearer failure point and ensures the user understands why the transaction might fail. users will immediately know that they need to approve the tokens before calling stake. It avoids calling transferFrom unnecessarily, saving gas if the allowance is insufficient.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The contract contains the functionality in which the claim function (and similar functions like withdraw), making an external call to transfer ERC20 tokens using the transfer function. Since the contract hasn't yet marked the claim as completed (i.e., updated the claimed variable), the attacker can exploit this to re-enter the claim function, repeatedly withdrawing tokens. The transfer happens first (interaction with an external contract) before the internal state is updated. The nonReentrant modifier ensures that any attempts to call the claim function again during execution are blocked, providing an additional safeguard. Therefore, It is recommended to do the check-effect-transaction method or use the non-reentrant modifier to prevent the code from this issue.
Resolved
#5 medium Issue
Missing access control.
There is no access control in the emergencyWithdraw function. As written, anyone can call this function and withdraw tokens to the beneficiary, which creates a major security risk. Access control is crucial to ensure that only authorized accounts, such as the contract owner, can execute sensitive functions like emergency withdrawals. To fix this, you can add a modifier for access control, typically restricting access to the contract owner. This can be achieved using Ownable from OpenZeppelin, or by implementing custom logic.
Resolved
#6 medium Issue
Missing allowance check.
Before calling transferFrom, the function should verify that the user has granted the required allowance to the staking contract. This provides a clearer failure point and ensures the user understands why the transaction might fail. users will immediately know that they need to approve the tokens before calling stake. It avoids calling transferFrom unnecessarily, saving gas if the allowance is insufficient.
Resolved
#7 medium Issue
The owner can drain tokens
The contract contains the functionality in which the owner of the contract can claim the staked tokens from the contract, which is not recommended as if the owner has claimed the staked tokens, the user will not be able to unstake their tokens from the contract. There must be a check that the owner can only recover the stucked tokens from the contract.
low Issues | 6 findings
Resolved
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Resolved
#4 low Issue
Array Mismatch Vulnerability
If the lengths of users and userStakes arrays do not match, this function could behave unpredictably or fail. For example, if users.length > userStakes.length, accessing userStakes[i] would cause an out-of-bounds array access, reverting the transaction. To mitigate this, Add a check to ensure both arrays have the same length before proceeding with the loop.
Resolved
#5 low Issue
No Validation of Stake Structure
There is no validation for the Stake object being pushed to the stakes mapping. Invalid or malicious data might be introduced, potentially leading to unexpected behavior. Include validation logic to ensure each Stake object meets your contract's requirements.
Pending
#6 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.