Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can update the verifier address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the OKZOO smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the OKZOO team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Evolution Bypass for Unregistered Users
The evolve() function lacks verification of user existence before processing stage evolution. Unlike the bonus() function with its onlyUser modifier, evolution doesn't check if user.lastCheckinDate != 0. This allows addresses that have never checked in to potentially bypass the normal progression flow if they obtain a valid evolution signature. To mitigate this, Apply the onlyUser modifier to the evolve() function or add an explicit check: if (user.lastCheckinDate == 0) revert UserDoesNotExist(); This ensures users must establish check-in history before evolving, maintaining the intended game progression.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Bonus Function Without Reward Distribution
The bonus() function lacks any mechanism to distribute rewards to users. When calling this function, a user's pendingBonus flag is reset to false and a BonusClaimed event is emitted, but no actual tokens, points, or rewards are transferred to the user. This creates a misleading situation where users complete the claim process without receiving any tangible benefit. To mitigate this, Implement actual reward distribution by either transferring tokens to the user, incrementing a rewards balance, or implementing another value transfer mechanism. Example: rewardToken.transfer(msg.sender, bonusAmount) or user.rewardsBalance += calculateBonus(user.streak).
low Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Potential User Lock on Failed Bonus Claim
The contract enforces users to claim pending bonuses before checking in. If a user reaches a streak multiple of 7, pendingBonus becomes true. If the user cannot obtain a valid signature for the bonus function (due to off-chain service downtime, verifier unavailability, etc.), they are blocked from checking in, breaking their streak and losing progress. To mitigate this, Implement a recovery mechanism allowing users to continue checking in if signature services are unavailable. Options include: (1) Admin function to reset pendingBonus flags, (2) Fallback check-in method that clears pendingBonus without requiring signature, or (3) Time-based auto-reset of pendingBonus after X days.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Redundant User Existence Check
The function only relies on the signature from the verifier without any on-chain requirements (like minimum streak count or number of consecutive check-ins). If the verifier key is compromised, an attacker could skip all game progression requirements.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.