OpenFundNet Info
OpenFundNet is a decentralized crowdfunding platform built on blockchain. It connects innovators with a global community of funders, while using validators and a milestone-based system to ensure transparency and fairness.
Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can upgrade the contract implementation without timelock protections (authorizeUpgrade).
-
The owner receives all slashed tokens from validator penalties (slashValidator). -
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can modify commission rates for any validator (updateCommissionRate). -
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can change minimum stake requirements at any time (updateMinSelfStake). -
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can alter cooldown periods for unstaking funds (updateCooldownPeriod). -
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can change slash percentages without limits (updateSlashPercentage). -
The SLASHER_ROLE can penalize validators and seize their tokens (slashValidator). -
The SLASHER_ROLE can force validators to lose their status by reducing stake below minimum.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the OFNT smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the OFNT team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing Parameter Validation in Admin Configuration Functions
Multiple admin functions in the StakingValidatorUpgradeable contract accept parameters without any validation constraints, creating significant risks to protocol operations. Specifically, updateCommissionRate has no upper bound check, allowing commission to be set to 100% or higher; updateMinSelfStake lacks both minimum and maximum thresholds, which could make validator entry impossible or trivial; updateCooldownPeriod has no reasonable timeframe limitations, potentially enabling instant withdrawals or permanently locked funds; and updateSlashPercentage has no upper limit, potentially allowing confiscation of a validator's entire stake for minor infractions. These unrestricted parameters give excessive power to admin role holders to arbitrarily change critical economic parameters without guardrails.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Delegator Balance Inconsistency in slashValidator Function
The slashValidator function reduces the validator's total delegated stake but fails to update the individual delegator balance records stored in the info.delegators mapping. This creates a critical accounting discrepancy where the sum of individual delegator balances no longer equals the validator's total delegated stake after slashing occurs. When delegators later attempt to withdraw their funds using requestUndelegate(), which checks against their individual recorded balance (info.delegators[msg.sender]), they may be able to withdraw more than their fair share post-slashing or find themselves unable to withdraw if the total delegatedStake becomes insufficient to cover all recorded individual claims.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
No Self-Delegation Prevention
The delegate function fails to prevent validators from delegating tokens to themselves, potentially causing accounting inconsistencies and confusion in the staking system. Since validators already have their funds tracked through the selfStake parameter, allowing them to also delegate to themselves creates parallel tracking paths for essentially the same funds. This could lead to double-counting issues, complicate accounting logic, and potentially affect reward calculations. To mitigate this vulnerability, add a simple check: require(msg.sender != validator, "Cannot delegate to self"); at the beginning of the delegate function to explicitly prevent validators from delegating to their own validator address.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.