Nefe coin Info
Welcome to Nefe Coin, a digital currency that fuses meme culture with deep, real-world utility. Inspired by ancient Egypt and Queen Nefertiti, Nefe Coin is built on the secure Ethereum blockchain and represents community, historical legacy, and a new era of borderless payments. Launched as an ERC-20 meme coin, Nefe Coin has a clear roadmap to evolve beyond its unique NFT collection into a comprehensive utility and reward solution for the global tourism and digital gaming industries. Join us in shaping the future of digital ownership, where your assets unlock real-world travel benefits, provide in-game rewards, and honor the past, creating a serious investment opportunity with long-term utility.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The admin can set the ICO contract address.
- The admin can update the release time.
- The admin can set a specific amount of tokens that are intended for future use.
- The admin can update the long-term delay.
- The admin can release tokens.
- The admin can withdraw the tokens from the contract.
- The admin can withdraw the long-term reserve value from the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the NEFE Staking smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the NEFE team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Centralized Administrative Control Allows Bypassing of Token Vesting Schedule
The updateReleaseTime function grants administrators the unilateral power to modify the unlock timestamp for any token release phase. The function lacks any validation to prevent the new timestamp from being set to a time in the past. This allows an admin to, at any moment, make any or all future vested token tranches immediately available for release. While this provides operational flexibility, it fundamentally undermines the core promise of a time-locked vesting schedule, which is a critical component of the project's tokenomics and a key pillar of investor trust. The existence of this unchecked administrative privilege creates a significant centralization risk, as it allows the team to bypass the publicly stated release schedule, potentially leading to premature token inflation and eroding holder confidence.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing Contract Validation on setIcoContract Risks Permanent Loss of Released Tokens
The setIcoContract function on line 122 only validates that the provided _icoContract address is not the zero address. It critically fails to verify that the address actually contains deployed contract code. An administrator could, through human error such as a copy-paste mistake, set the ICO contract address to an Externally Owned Account (EOA). This would lead to the permanent and irreversible loss of all tokens released from the staking contract. The releaseTokens function transfers tokens directly to the icoContract address. If this address is an EOA to which no one holds the private key (a "black hole" address) or an address controlled by a malicious actor, all tokens sent there will be either lost forever or stolen.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Acknowledged
#1 informational Issue
Tightly Coupled Contract Interaction Creates a Single Point of Failure
The releaseTokens function in the TokenStaking contract is tightly coupled with the IcoContract, performing a complex, multi-step sequence of five external calls within a single loop to manage the state of the ICO. This design is architecturally brittle and creates a single point of failure. If any one of these external calls to the IcoContract were to fail permanently—for example, due to a bug introduced in a future upgrade of the IcoContract—the entire releaseTokens transaction would revert. Because this is the only function that can move vested tokens to the ICO, such a failure would make it impossible to ever release tokens again, permanently and irreversibly freezing the project's entire token sale and distribution pipeline.
Resolved
#2 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.