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Nefe coin Info

www.nefecoin.com

Welcome to Nefe Coin, a digital currency that fuses meme culture with deep, real-world utility. Inspired by ancient Egypt and Queen Nefertiti, Nefe Coin is built on the secure Ethereum blockchain and represents community, historical legacy, and a new era of borderless payments. Launched as an ERC-20 meme coin, Nefe Coin has a clear roadmap to evolve beyond its unique NFT collection into a comprehensive utility and reward solution for the global tourism and digital gaming industries. Join us in shaping the future of digital ownership, where your assets unlock real-world travel benefits, provide in-game rewards, and honor the past, creating a serious investment opportunity with long-term utility.

Nefe coin Logo
Onboarded date 21/11/2025

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

80.00
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

Select the audit
"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/11/21
Revision date 2025/11/21

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The admin can add or remove the payment tokens from the contract.
  • The admin can update the staking contract address.
  • The staking contract can set the token price from staking.
  • The staking contract can set the reward percentage.
  • The staking contract can start the release.
  • The staking contract can stop the release.
  • The admin can add or remove receivers in the contract.
  • The admin can reset receivers in the contract.
  • The admin can pause the buy functionality in the contract.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the NEFE ICO smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the NEFE team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
Medium
Low
Optimization
Informational
medium Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Missing Contract Validation on setStakingContract Allows Breaking Core ICO Functionality
ICOContract.sol
L147-151
Description

The setStakingContract function at line 147 only validates that the provided _staking address is not the zero address. It does not verify that the address has contract code deployed to it. An administrator, due to human error (e.g., copy-pasting the wrong address), could accidentally set the stakingContract to an Externally Owned Account (EOA) or any other non-contract address. If this occurs, the core mechanism of the ICO will be permanently broken. All functions that are essential for managing the ICO's phases—such as beginRelease, endRelease, and updateTokenPriceFromStaking—are protected by the onlyFromStaking modifier, which checks that msg.sender == stakingContract. If stakingContract is set to an incorrect EOA, any legitimate calls from the actual TokenStaking.sol contract will fail this check and revert. This will halt all future token releases and price updates, effectively freezing the ICO's progression.

Comments

To prevent this, a validation check must be added to the setStakingContract function to confirm that the _staking address is a smart contract. This can be reliably achieved by checking the size of the code at the address using extcodesize. If the code size is greater than zero, it confirms the address is a contract. A new error, such as AddressNotAContract, should be added and the function should revert if this check fails. This ensures that the integration between the ICO and staking contracts cannot be broken by accidental misconfiguration, thereby hardening the system against a critical operational failure.

low Issues | 2 findings

Resolved

#1 low Issue
Redundant Functions in ICO Contract
ICOContract.sol
L157-161
L338-342
Description

The IcoContract.sol smart contract contains two functions, setTokenPriceFromStaking (at line 157) and updateTokenPriceFromStaking (at line 338), which have identical logic and visibility. Both functions serve the purpose of allowing the staking contract to update the tokenPrice. This redundancy introduces unnecessary code into the contract, which can increase deployment costs and add to the cognitive load for developers and auditors. A review of the related TokenStaking.sol contract reveals that only the updateTokenPriceFromStaking function is actively being used, rendering setTokenPriceFromStaking extraneous.

Comments

To resolve this issue, it is recommended to remove the unused setTokenPriceFromStaking function from the IcoContract.sol contract. By eliminating this redundant code, the contract will be simplified, its bytecode size will be reduced, and potential for future confusion will be minimized. The updateTokenPriceFromStaking function should be retained as it is the one being called by the TokenStaking contract to manage token price updates during release phases. No further changes are required as the removal of the unused function does not impact any other part of the system's logic.

Resolved

#2 low Issue
Unbounded Loop in unlockedAvailable Function Creates Denial of Service Risk
ICOContract.sol
L190-213
Description

The unlockedAvailable function contains a for loop that iterates over the releaseLocks mapping from 0 to releasesCount. The releasesCount variable, which dictates the number of iterations, can grow indefinitely as new release phases are initiated by the staking contract. Each iteration of this loop performs a storage read, which consumes a significant amount of gas. As releasesCount increases over the contract's operational lifetime, the cumulative gas cost required to execute the loop will eventually exceed the block gas limit. This will cause any transaction that calls unlockedAvailable to fail, creating a permanent Denial of Service (DoS) condition. Because the withdrawRemainingTokens function critically depends on unlockedAvailable to determine the withdrawable balance, this vulnerability will render the withdrawal function permanently inoperable, effectively locking any unsold tokens in the contract forever.

Comments

To mitigate this critical issue, the design pattern of iterating over an unbounded data structure within a single transaction must be eliminated. The withdrawRemainingTokens function should be refactored to process releases in manageable batches rather than all at once. This can be achieved by modifying the function to accept parameters such as a _startIndex and a _batchSize or _endIndex. This change would allow an administrator to make multiple, smaller withdrawal transactions, each processing a subset of the total releases. By breaking the operation into discrete, bounded chunks, it ensures that the gas cost of each individual transaction remains safely within the block gas limit, thereby guaranteeing that the withdrawal functionality remains accessible throughout the entire lifecycle of the contract, regardless of the number of release phases.

informational Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
ICOContract.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Resolved

#2 informational Issue
Missing events arithmetic
ICOContract.sol
L157-161
L330-332
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.

Resolved

#3 informational Issue
Unused Parameter and Redundant Logic
ICOContract.sol
L290-313
Description

The buyTokens function contains two inefficiencies that increase transaction costs for users and add unnecessary complexity to the code. Firstly, the function requires a _referralCode parameter of type bytes32. This parameter is not used in any on-chain logic; its value is only passed through to the TokensPurchased event. This forces users to include and pay for data that has no functional impact on the token purchase. Secondly, the function performs a redundant balance check. On line 300, it verifies if the contract's token balance is sufficient to cover tokensToBuy. However, a more comprehensive check is performed later on line 308, which ensures the balance can cover totalSend (the purchase amount plus the reward). Since totalSend is always greater than or equal to tokensToBuy, the initial check on line 300 is superfluous and serves no purpose.

Comments

To optimize the contract and reduce user transaction costs, these inefficiencies should be removed. It is recommended to first remove the _referralCode parameter from the buyTokens function signature and the corresponding TokensPurchased event, unless there is a plan to implement an on-chain referral system. Secondly, the redundant balance check on line 300 (if (icoToken.balanceOf(address(this)) < tokensToBuy) revert TokensUnavailable();) should be deleted. The subsequent check on line 308 is sufficient to ensure the contract has enough tokens to fulfill the purchase and the reward. These changes will make the function more gas-efficient and improve the overall clarity and maintainability of the codebase.