Moltera Info
Moltera is a real-time browser RPG where every sword you temper to +9, every duel you win, and every item you trade belongs to you — powered by $MLT, the molten heart of the realm.
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Smart Contract Analysis Statement
Contract Analysis
The Moltera contract implements an ERC20 token with a fixed, one-time supply of 100,000,000 MLT (18 decimals) minted in full to the initial owner at deployment, and nothing beyond the standard token behavior plus a simple ownership role. There is no mint function after deployment, no burn entrypoint, no pause, no blacklist, no transfer fee, no anti-whale limit, and no upgrade path. The verified source is an exact match to the code running on-chain, and the token behaves as a plain, predictable transferable asset.
Ownership Privileges
The ownership of the contract has been assigned to a single externally owned account and remains active and not renounced. The owner retains full privileges including:
- Transferring ownership of the contract to another address in a single step.
- Renouncing ownership, which permanently leaves the contract without an owner.
- Acting as a normal token holder over its own balance and allowances, like any other address.
- Holding the initial full token supply that was minted to it at deployment, to distribute as it sees fit.
- Limitation - the owner cannot mint new tokens; the supply is fixed forever.
- Limitation - the owner cannot burn, freeze, or seize tokens held by other addresses.
- Limitation - the owner cannot pause transfers, blacklist addresses, or set any fee.
- Limitation - the owner cannot upgrade or change the contract logic, since it is not upgradeable.
Security Features
The contract implements several positive security features:
- A fixed supply with no reachable mint or burn entrypoint, so the total supply cannot change after deployment.
- Built on a well-established, widely reviewed standard token implementation, using modern built-in overflow and underflow protection.
- No external calls anywhere in the code, which removes reentrancy and callback-based attack surfaces entirely.
- An ownership role that carries no authority over holder funds, so even a compromised owner key cannot mint, freeze, seize, or dilute anyone's balance.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Moltera smart contract. This analysis did not include economic analysis of the contract's tokenomics. Moreover, we only audited the main contract for the Moltera team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Single-step ownership transfer
The token uses a plain single-step ownership model. Transferring ownership takes effect immediately with no acceptance step from the recipient, and renouncing ownership sets the owner to the zero address permanently. A mistyped or non-controllable recipient address would lose the ownership title for good. The practical impact is contained because the owner has no power over balances, supply, or transfers - the only thing at stake is a title that carries no operational rights.
Pending
#2 low Issue
EVM version newer than the target chain
The contract was compiled against a very recent EVM target that is newer than the fork active on many chains, and the runtime relies on the PUSH0 opcode. On the chain where it is currently deployed this works correctly and the contract executes as expected, so there is no live problem for this deployment. The risk is forward-looking: reusing the same build settings to deploy on a chain whose active fork is older could produce a contract that fails to deploy or execute.
optimization Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Non-payable constructor
The constructor is non-payable, which adds a small one-time check at deployment. Marking it payable would shave a negligible amount of deployment gas. This is a minor, optional observation with no security relevance.
Pending
#2 optimization Issue
Compound assignment on a storage variable
Updating a storage variable with a compound assignment can be marginally more expensive than writing the sum explicitly on some compiler versions. The occurrence is inside the inherited standard token library used to move balances and supply, which should be relied on as-is rather than modified.
informational Issues | 8 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating and inconsistent compiler pragmas
The flattened source contains several floating and range pragmas that allow the code to compile under a spread of compiler versions. The deployed artifact is fixed to one version, so this mainly affects future recompilation hygiene rather than the live contract, but a floating pragma can lead to accidentally building with a different compiler than the one reviewed.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Dead code and unused declarations from flattening
The flattened file pulls in a shared errors interface that also defines errors for other token standards this contract does not implement, and it inherits a few internal helper functions that are never reached, including an internal burn helper. None of this is reachable or exploitable, but it enlarges the source and could mislead a reader into thinking a burn path exists when it does not.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Owner role grants no token-level power
The contract inherits an ownership mechanism, but no function other than ownership management itself is restricted to the owner. The role therefore adds an owner slot and an access-control surface without giving the owner any ability to mint, burn, pause, blacklist, set fees, or otherwise affect holders. This is good for holders, but it can mislead outside observers into assuming powers that do not exist.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
Large numeric literal without grouping
The premint amount is written as a long unseparated number multiplied by ten to the power of the decimals. The value is correct and does not overflow, but a long literal like this is easy to misread during review.
Pending
#5 informational Issue
ERC20 approval race condition
Approving an allowance overwrites the previous value. A spender watching the transaction pool could in principle use the old allowance and then the new one across an approval change. This behavior is inherent to the standard and depends on the approving user's own actions rather than any flaw specific to this token.
Pending
#6 informational Issue
Compiler version considerations
The range pragmas nominally permit older compiler versions that carry known bugs, which is mitigated because the deployed artifact is pinned to one specific recent version. Separately, the explorer flags this compiler version against two known compiler advisories, but neither applies here: the contract uses simple linear inheritance with no mutually recursive functions, and it is a single non-upgradeable deployment whose storage layout was confirmed to be the standard ordering.
Pending
#7 informational Issue
Missing documentation on the project contract
The project-authored contract and its constructor have no documentation comments describing the token, the fixed supply, or the meaning of the initial owner argument. This is a maintainability and clarity point with no security impact.
Pending
#8 informational Issue
Mixed library versions in the flattened source
The flattened file combines standard-library files taken from several different point releases. They are compatible in this simple token, but mixing versions can, in larger codebases, combine files that were never released or tested together.