MintMeme Info
Mintmeme is a fully decentralized memecoin launch platform. Unlike other launchers, it uses the widely recognized and fair BRC20 model, which helps significantly reduce dev frontrunning and manipulation of insider information.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is renounced
The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no ownership privileges in this contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Mintmeme Token smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Mintmeme team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Missing access control.
The addLiquidity() function is public and callable by anyone once the minting process is complete. While this might be an intentional design (to allow any participant to trigger liquidity provision), it might also allow for unexpected or untimely liquidity addition if called prematurely or in a way that disrupts the intended flow. There is no modifier (such as onlyOwner or a custom role check) limiting who may call it. If the timing or conditions for liquidity addition are not strictly controlled by external logic (e.g., in the factory or user instructions), a caller could trigger liquidity addition under less-than-ideal circumstances. This may affect token pricing or distribution unexpectedly.
low Issues | 3 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Acknowledged
#2 low Issue
Refund–Mint Cycle Vulnerability
The refund–mint cycle vulnerability occurs because the contract allows users to refund their tokens before transfers are unlocked, which effectively reduces the total token supply. Specifically, the _refund() function burns the caller’s tokens by calling _burn(msg.sender, mintAmountPerAddress) and returns the exact amount of ETH paid. However, the minting process in the mint() function only checks that the total supply plus one mint’s amount does not exceed the maximum mintable amount. Since the refund operation decreases the total supply, it resets the condition that prevents over-minting. As a result, a user can mint tokens, refund them to reclaim their ETH (thereby burning the tokens), and then mint again—repeating this cycle to obtain more tokens than originally intended. This loophole undermines the fair distribution mechanism of the contract.
Acknowledged
#3 low Issue
Lack of Mint-Per-Address Restriction
The issue arises because the contract does not record if an address has already participated in the minting process. Without such a record, a user can call the mint function multiple times, and by using the refund mechanism to burn their tokens and reclaim ETH, they can effectively reset their minting status and mint again. This loophole undermines the intended fair distribution of tokens, as it allows a single participant to exceed their allotted share. To mitigate this, you should introduce a mapping (e.g., mapping(address => bool) hasMinted;) that tracks whether an address has already minted its allocation. Then, update the mint function to check this mapping before allowing a mint, ensuring each address can only mint once or only up to a predetermined limit.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 optimization Issue
Public function that could be declared external (external-function)
Use the `external` attribute for functions never called from the contract.