Mey Network Info

Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.

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TrustNet Score

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16.56
Poor Excellent

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Security Assessments

Select the audit
"\"\\\"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review\\\"\""
Contract address
N/A
Network N/A
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/01/11
Revision date 2025/01/11

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is not renounced

The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.

Contract is upgradeable

The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.


Ownership Privileges

NFTMarketPlace.sol

  • The owner or factory contract can add new contracts to the allowed NFT contracts.
  • The sellers can cancel multiple NFT listings using order IDs.
  • The owner can update the factory contract address. 

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Mey Network smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Mey Network team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Findings and Audit result

high Issues | 1 findings

Acknowledged

#1 high Issue
Incorrect Handling of Multiple Sellers
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L131-157
Description

The buyNFTBatch function incorrectly assumes that all NFTs in a batch belong to a single seller, storing only the last seller’s address during the loop. This results in the total payment being transferred to the last seller, neglecting other sellers in the batch. For example, if two NFTs are purchased from different sellers, the entire payment goes to the second seller, leaving the first unpaid. This flaw disrupts payment distribution and undermines seller trust. To fix this, the function should track payments for each seller in a mapping and ensure individual payouts after processing the entire batch.

medium Issues | 7 findings

Acknowledged

#1 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L87-123
Description

The listNFTBatch function lacks a check to ensure the nftContract address is a valid smart contract. Without this, users could provide non-contract addresses (e.g., EOAs), leading to runtime failures, wasted gas, and potential security risks. To address this, the function should validate the nftContract using Solidity’s address.code.length or OpenZeppelin’s Address.isContract utility. Adding this check ensures only valid NFT contracts are processed, preventing unintended behavior, enhancing security, and improving user experience. This simple validation avoids unnecessary computations and provides clear error feedback when an invalid address is provided. This improves the function’s robustness and usability.

Acknowledged

#2 medium Issue
Lack of Token Approval Check
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L87-123
Description

The listNFTBatch function assumes that the tokens are already approved for transfer to the marketplace without explicitly verifying approval. If the user has not granted the required approval for the marketplace to transfer their NFTs, the transaction will fail, resulting in wasted gas and a poor user experience. To address this, the function should check whether the marketplace is approved for the specific token ID (getApproved) or for all tokens of the user (isApprovedForAll) before attempting the transfer. Adding this check prevents failed transactions, improves efficiency, and ensures a smoother user experience during batch NFT listing.

Acknowledged

#3 medium Issue
Lack of Token ID Range Check
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L87-123
Description

The function starts iterating token IDs from 1 without a defined range or upper limit. If the token IDs in the NFT contract are sparse or do not start from 1, the function could waste significant gas iterating through invalid or non-existent token IDs. For contracts with extremely high token ID ranges, this could lead to gas exhaustion. Allow the user to specify the token IDs to list, rather than iterating.

Acknowledged

#4 medium Issue
Lack of Validation for Buyer’s USDT Balance and Allowance
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L131-157
Description

The function does not check if the buyer has sufficient USDT balance or allowance before accumulating the totalPrice. If the buyer lacks sufficient funds or approval, the transaction will revert at the transferFrom call after processing all listings, wasting gas. Validate the buyer’s USDT balance and allowance at the start so that this issue can be mitigated from the function.

Acknowledged

#5 medium Issue
Lack of Validation for Active Listings
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L131-157
Description

The function does not check whether all orderIds correspond to active listings before processing. This validation happens during the loop, meaning inactive listings can cause partial execution without reverting the transaction for invalid entries. If orderIds[1] is inactive, the function processes orderIds[0] but reverts midway, wasting gas. This partial execution leaves buyers confused and listings in an inconsistent state. To mitigate this, validate all listings before processing.

Acknowledged

#6 medium Issue
Missing threshold for Max batch size.
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L131-157
Description

The buyNFTBatch function processes each order ID sequentially, performing multiple operations like retrieving listings, transferring NFTs, updating state, and emitting events for each item. This linear approach causes gas costs to increase significantly with larger batch sizes, making the function inefficient and potentially unaffordable for users purchasing many NFTs at once. For example, a batch of 50 NFTs could exceed block gas limits or incur excessive transaction fees. To address this, the function should implement a maximum batch size limit, optimize repetitive operations, or consider splitting large batches into smaller, more manageable transactions for better efficiency and user experience.

Acknowledged

#7 medium Issue
Missing 'isContract' check for factory address.
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L191-196
Description

The contract lacks a validation check to ensure that specific parameters are contract addresses. Without this check, there is a risk that non-contract addresses (such as externally owned accounts, or EOAs) could be mistakenly set for parameters intended to reference other contracts. This could lead to failures in executing critical interactions within the contract, as EOAs do not support contract-specific functions. To mitigate this, Implement a validation check to ensure that parameters designated as contract addresses are verified as such. This can be done using Solidity’s Address library function isContract, which checks if an address has associated contract code.

low Issues | 4 findings

Acknowledged

#1 low Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L2
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

Acknowledged

#2 low Issue
No Handling for Duplicate Listings
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L87-123
Description

The function does not check whether the NFT is already listed, allowing duplicate listings. This could lead to incorrect data or redundancy in the marketplace. To mitigate this, add a check to ensure the token is not already listed.

Acknowledged

#3 low Issue
No Handling for Partial Purchases
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L131-157
Description

If one of the listings in the batch fails (e.g., due to insufficient approvals or inactive listings), the entire transaction reverts. This prevents the successful purchase of valid NFTs in the batch. If orderIds[2] fails due to an inactive listing, the first two valid purchases (orderIds[0] and orderIds[1]) are also reverted. Users lose gas and must retry the entire transaction. Implement partial execution with a fallback for failed listings

Acknowledged

#4 low Issue
Lack of Validation for orderIds
NFTMarketPlace.sol
L160-174
Description

The function assumes that all provided orderIds are valid and belong to the caller. If an invalid or non-existent orderId is passed, the function will revert when accessing. This results in wasted gas and incomplete execution. It is recommended to validate all orderIds before proceeding to execute the function.