Mey Network Info
Mey Network is an integrated blockchain ecosystem designed to bridge the gap between physical assets and the digital world. By combining the power of Meychain—a dedicated Layer 1 blockchain for Real-World Assets (RWAs)—and MeyFi, our decentralized nance platform, Mey Network enables seamless tokenization, trading, and management of assets in a secure, scalable environment.
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can add/remove a whitelist manager.
- The owner or whitelist manager can add a whitelist user.
- The owner can remove the whitelisted user.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to add a user to the whitelist.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to remove a user from the whitelist.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to add multiple users to the whitelist.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the token amount for a whitelisted user.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the token address.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the first release percentage.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the vesting start time.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the cliff duration.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the total number of vesting periods.
- Allows a whitelist manager or the owner to update the duration of each vesting period.
- Allows the owner to rescue any ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the contract.
- Allows the owner to withdraw any Ether sent to the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the TokenVesting smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the TokenVesting team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Unrestricted Token Address Modification After Vesting Starts
The TokenVesting.sol contract contained a critical vulnerability within the updateToken function. This function permitted the contract owner or a whitelist manager to change the underlying ERC20 token address at any point, even after the vesting schedule had begun and users had been whitelisted. This flaw could be exploited by a malicious or compromised owner to perform a "bait-and-switch." They could initialize the contract with a legitimate token, and then, after the vesting is active, replace it with a worthless or fraudulent token. Vested users would then only be able to claim the illegitimate token, leading to a complete loss of their expected assets.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Owner Can Drain All Vested Tokens
An issue existed in the rescueStuckErc20 function, which was designed to allow the contract owner to retrieve any unrelated ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the contract. The function lacked a crucial safety check to prevent it from being called with the address of the primary vesting token. This oversight created a backdoor, granting the owner the unilateral power to withdraw the entire pool of tokens that were supposed to be locked for users. A malicious or compromised owner could exploit this to drain the contract of all its funds, nullifying the vesting agreement and leaving whitelisted participants unable to claim their rightful assets.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Vesting Schedule Can Be Maliciously Altered Mid-Process
The contract contains a critical vulnerability where essential vesting parameters can be modified by the owner at any time, even after the vesting period has started. The functions updateCliff, updateFirstRelease, updateTotalPeriods, and updateTimePerPeriod lack a time-lock validation. This allows a malicious or compromised owner to unilaterally change the rules of the agreement after users have been whitelisted and the process is underway. For instance, the owner could indefinitely extend the cliff period, reduce the number of payment periods, or alter the token release frequency, effectively locking user funds for longer than promised or changing the payout structure to their benefit.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
Remove unused code.